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I. INTRODUCTION

The cycle of poor credit history is a powerful one. An individual or
business with a low credit rating, perhaps from the late payment of past
bills, will have difficulty gaining access to traditional forms of lending.
According to some sources, many banks within the United States may
even collect data about the financial histories of individuals with respect
to their bank accounts and use that information to prohibit individuals
with a poor record from opening or maintaining a checking account.1
Yet, it is the status of maintaining a traditional bank account that
provides creditors with the assurance that an individual or business is
credit worthy. 2 Without access to credit, those with a poor or nonexistent credit history will not have the opportunity to improve their
ratings. Thus, the cycle continues: those with bad credit are unable to
gain access to loans or to make improvements to their businesses.3 They

* Robert W. Emerson, B.A., Sewanee: Univ. of the South; J.D., Harvard Law School. Huber
Hurst Professor of Business Law, Univ. of Florida.
1. James Marvin Perez, Blacklisted: The Unwarranted Divestment of Access to Bank
Accounts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1586, 1587–96 (2005).
2. Id. at 1587.
3. There is a funding crisis for some businesses, which certainly extends to franchising.
Analysis from early 2011 finds only 31% of business owners with assets, such as cash, sufficient to
meet the collateral requirements of banks and Small Business Administration (SBA) lenders. See
“Collateral Crisis” Creates Unprecedented Divide Among Small Business Owners: MultiFunding’s
National Small Business Lending Snapshot Results, MULTIFUNDING (May 5, 2011), http:/
/multifunding.com/uncategorized/small-businesses-divided-by-lenders-the-haves-and-the-havenots/.
These are the “asset rich” business owners who are most likely to benefit from low interest rates via
a commercial mortgage or a loan program backed by the SBA. Id. Twice as many business owners
are either “marginal (B grade) business owners” (47%) or “non-lendable (C grade) business
owners” (15%), who all lack the assets backing their business and needed for the standard lending
arrangements. Id. The “B Borrowers” who are “marginal” have adequate credit and cash flow, but
must turn to Factoring, Merchant Cash Advance Loans, Unsecured Loans or Private Money Loans;
to get financing, they must pay a high premium because of their lack of collateral. Id. As for the
non-lendable group, their bad credit and poor cash flow, along with having no collateral, means
even the fringe lending would be extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain. Id. Therefore, a
national lending crisis faces more than 30 million small businesses; this is particularly problematic
for the smaller “small” businesses, which have under $1 million in income. Id. The C borrowers’
only option would be microlenders, with loans capped at $35,000 to $50,000. See Dawn Rivers,
This Month, a New Financing Crisis for Small Businesses, SMALL BUSINESS TRENDS (June 3,
2011), http://smallbiztrends.com/2011/06/new-financing-crisis-small-businesses.html; Rebecca
Mowbray, A New Crop of Microlenders Can Help Businesses When Larger Banks Can’t, THE
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are stuck in the fringe economy: a banking world where consumers and
small businesses alike suffer from questionable practices and, at least for
the consumers, inadequate regulation.
This Article considers fringe banking issues—the gaps or problems
in service for both individuals and businesses when the usual banking
channels are impractical or even unavailable. Some people may only
have recourse to the robust, but often very expensive and less protected,
financial products sold for what is, or is supposed to be, a very shortterm basis. The Article first examines the fringe banking world, but
ultimately considers whether and how consumer protections are needed
for franchisees. Small businesses, including franchisees, are often the
forgotten players in the fringe economy. If a franchise actually engages
in selling fringe banking products, it almost certainly got to that position
by not engaging in the financial practices it now trumpets and sells to
others. If a franchisee buys fringe banking products, whether and how
this small businessperson deserves the regulatory protections of a person
not engaged in business is a matter not just for statutory or
administrative law but also requires consideration of the franchise
relationship and its likely impact on franchisee finances.
II. FILLING THE FINANCIAL SERVICES GAP: THE RISE AND REGULATION
OF FRINGE BANKING
A.

The Dramatic Growth of Fringe Services

In the past two decades, fringe banking services have grown from
near nonexistence into a $100 billion business,4 with more checkcashing and payday lending locations in the United States than
McDonald’s, Burger King, Target, Sears, JCPenney, and Wal-Mart
locations combined. 5 Indeed, there are many nontraditional fringe

TIMES-PICAYUNE, (July 31, 2011, 8:00 AM) http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/
2011/07/a_new_crop_of_microlenders_can.html (noting that after the 2008 financial crisis, the
tightening of lending requirements has created an opening for microlenders to furnish financing to
small businesses, including franchisees; microlenders tout default rates that they claim are lower
than for-business-loans through traditional lending institutions).
4. Joe Mahon, Tracking “Fringe Banking,” FEDGAZETTE (Sept. 1, 2008),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4030 (noting a report of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis).
5. Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between Fringe Banking
and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361, 1363 (2011) (citing HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED:
LIFE AND DEBT IN THE FRINGE ECONOMY 6 (2005)). Total fringe-banking outlets, though, evidently
have started to shrink. For example, the number of payday loan stores fell from 24,200 in 2006 to
19,700 in 2010. Maya Jackson Randall & Alan Zibel, A Payday Loan in Disguise? Consumer

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
ARTICLE 1_EMERSON_WORD (DO NOT DELETE)

4

AKRON LAW REVIEW

4/5/2013 4:49 PM

[46:01

lending locations. 6 For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) reports that about eighteen percent of all U.S.
households have relied on pawn shops, payday lenders, or check-cashing
outlets at least once throughout the past five years.7 While many of
these customers do in fact possess bank accounts, they responded to an
FDIC survey that they plan to continue using these fringe services due to
their convenience and the ease of acquiring loans.8 In addition, one
report states that the typical user for payday loans is actually the head of
a family unit with checking accounts and steady employment, but with
blemished credit. 9
Financial institutions subject to federal regulation, such as banks
and credit unions, have been the traditional resource for consumers and
businesses seeking to procure loans and to cash checks. However, with
nearly seventeen million Americans, or 7.7% of all households, without
any sort of checking or savings account,10 there has been an increasing

Advocates, Banks Spar over ‘Direct-Deposit Advances’; the Yates Case, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13,
2011,
at
B2,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB20001424053111904006104576502793158420916.html (reporting the estimates of investment
banking-firm Stephens Inc.).
6. Jacob Goldstein, Wal-Mart Goes Big In Fringe Banking, NPR (Mar. 17, 2010, 1:00 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2010/03/walmart_goes_big_in_fringe_ban.html (noting that WalMart had “MoneyCenters” in a thousand of its U.S. stores and planned to add 400 more by the end
of 2010, bringing the total to 40% of the Wal-Marts in America; the centers offer such fringebanking services as check cashing); Andrew Martin & Stephanie Clifford, High Bank Fees Give
Wal-Mart a Money Aisle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/business/wal-mart-benefits-from-anger-over-bankingfees.html?pagewanted=all (noting that over 1,000 U.S. Wal-Mart stores permit customers to cash
work and government checks, pay bills, wire money overseas, and load money on to a prepaid debit
card).
7. David Ellis, 17 Million Americans Have No Bank Account, CNN MONEY (Dec. 2, 2009,
6:11 PM EST), http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/02/news/economy/fdic_survey/. Fringe lending
practices are also prominent in other nations, such as Australia. Infosys Technologies Ltd., Fringe
Lending in Australia – An Overview, INFOSYS TECH. LTD. (Feb. 2008), http://www.nab.com.au/
vgnmedia/downld/Infosys_Fringe_Lending_Study_PDF.pdf.
8. Ellis, supra note 7.
9. Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model that
Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 8–15 (2003).
10. Ellis, supra note 7. This percentage of the “unbanked” has increased since 2009, up
821,000 more U.S. households—a 0.6 percentage point increase bringing the percentage to well
over eight percent. Halah Touryalai, Who Needs Banks? Number of Americans Without Bank
Accounts Rises, FORBES, Sept. 17, 2012, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/20
12/09/17/who-needs-banks-number-of-americans-without-bank-accounts-rises/ (further noting that
28.3% of all U.S. households conduct some or all of their financial transactions outside of the
mainstream banking system, with over two-thirds of these households being “underbanked”—with a
checking or savings account but also using payday loans, rent-to-own arrangements, pawn shops,
refund anticipation loans, and/or non-bank money orders, check cashing, or remittances).
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need to provide financial services through alternative means. It appears
that even those with bank accounts may have financial needs that
standard banks cannot or will not meet, such as advanced payments to
cover emergency expenses or small loans that are too hard to acquire.11
For individuals with poor credit records, access to credit may be as
limited as for those that are without bank accounts entirely. 12
Fringe banking organizations, a term used to characterize any
financial service provider offering products outside of the standard
banking industry, 13 have become the main financial resource for the
“unbanked” and individuals lacking suitable credit. Fringe banking
outlets include check-cashing businesses, 14 payday lenders, 15 and pawn
shops. 16
Indeed, for many small businesses, such as franchisees, pawn shops
have become a prominent source of funds, albeit usually just a short-

11. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services
Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of
Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 606-08 (2000).
12. John P. Caskey, Explaining the Boom in Check-Cashing Outlets and Pawnshops, 49
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 5 (1995).
13. Indeed, fringe banking encompasses any non-traditional lending source. See generally
Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 629 (discussing the fringe banking system and its impact on
minority communities).
14. Check-cashing outlets provide cash advance loans, in which an individual or business
writes the provider a check for a specified loan amount plus a fee. Betts v. McKenzie Check
Advance of Fla., 879 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). The lender will keep the fee and
give the individual the value of the loan in cash, but will not cash the individual’s check until a later
date. Id. at 669. Prior to the expiration of the loan, the consumer can receive his check from the
lender by providing the lender the same value in cash. Id. If the individual cannot provide the cash
value to the lender, the loan can be rolled over with an extended expiration date and the consumer
paying an additional fee. Id. This rollover process may continue several times, with fees incurred
at each occurrence, or the individual may default and pay the fee for insufficient funds when the
lender attempts to cash the check. Id.
15. Payday lenders offer similar loans to check-cashing businesses, but the check written to
the fringe provider is postdated to the date of the individual’s next paycheck. Jim Hawkins &
Ronald J. Mann, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 857 (2007). The lender then gives the
individual cash immediately, holds onto the check, and retains the fee from the individual. Id. at
857. On the date of the check, which should coincide with the individual’s receipt of his next
paycheck, the lender deposits the check as repayment for the loan. Id. These loans are typically for
small dollar amounts, such as $500 or less, but the fees associated with the advance typically exceed
an APR of over 400%. WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, 1 THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS:
BANKRUPTCY, SECURITY INTERESTS, COLLECTION 1:20 (rev. ed. 2011).
16. Ellis, supra note 7. Pawn shops also provide small loans to individuals and businesses,
with the collateral for the loan being not a postdated check, but an item of value; see also Caskey,
supra note 12, at 4. The debtor leaves that item with the pawn shop, which provides cash to the
debtor in an amount less than the value of the collateral. Id. Most loans mature after one month;
however, similar to check-cashing outlets, pawn shops give debtors the option of rolling over the
loan, something typically available indefinitely, with fees, of course, incurred each time. Id.
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term solution to “help a struggling business stay afloat a little while
longer, which may be all the business needs to recover.” 17 Also, various
lenders provide credit in the form of auto title loans, 18 comparable
property loans, 19 and refund anticipation loans. 20

17. Cynthia Hsu, Small Business Owners Turn to Pawn Shops, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2011,
4:51
AM
EDT),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/10/tagblogsfindlawcom2011freeenterprise-idUS334756794120110810; see also Katherine Scarrow, Need a Small Business
Loan? Try the Pawn Shop, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada) (Aug. 11, 2011, 10:42 AM EDT),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/small-business/small-business-briefing/needa-small-business-loan-try-the-pawn-shop/article2126295/.
Alternatively, the argument is that a small, struggling business, being forced to resort to fringe
banking and the high interest rates implicit in fringe banking may only perpetuate or contribute to
additional economic troubles, if not collapse. Id.
18. While auto title loans are analogous to check-cashing and payday loans, the collateral that
the creditor holds is an individual’s automobile title. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J.
ON REG. 121, 164 (2004). These loans are typically within the range of $250 to $1,000 and have a
one-month term of repayment. Id. at 164. If the borrower does not repay the loan and the interest
accrued, the lender repossesses the automobile and may retain the proceeds from the sale of the
automobile, even when the value exceeds the amount of the loan. Id. at 164-65. Title lending is
arguably an especially egregious service, as the borrower gives her vehicle as collateral for a cash
loan. Id. at 166. If the borrower is unable to repay the loan, her mode of transportation is lost,
which may be her sole method of getting to work or getting her children to school. Id.
One report indicated that 9.18% of new-title vehicles were repossessed in Tennessee in 2008 for
failure to repay a loan amount. Jim Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of AutoTitle Lending, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 565 (2012). As such, borrowers take on a huge risk in
choosing to get a loan, even if the numbers have sometimes been overstated. Id. at 560-61, 565
(concluding that confusing reports from Tennessee led to the erroneous conclusion in a 2007 law
review article, Jean Ann Fox, Fringe Bankers: Economic Predators or a New Financing Services
Model?, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 135, 140 (2007), that 35% to 50% of auto-title loans resulted in
repossessions while the actual rate of repossession was three to seven times smaller and reporting
figures from six states—Idaho, Illinois, Montana, Oregon, Tennessee, and Virginia—indicating that
“repossession rates for those states are much lower than previous research has indicated”).
19. Some lenders provide a service similar to auto title loans, involving collateral other than
motor vehicles; they instead use household appliances as the collateral. Barr, supra note 18, at 164.
20. Refund anticipation loans (RALs) may be less prominent than other fringe lending
services such as auto title or payday or check-cashing loans, in part because these tend to be
seasonal, typically existing in the early part of the year when persons are completing their tax forms
and awaiting a refund. These loans, though, have been very popular. Kathryn Smetana, Refund
Anticipation Loans: Less Money for Consumers Entitled to Refunds, More Profit for H&R Block, 14
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 371, 371 (2002) (noting that an estimated eleven million taxpayers utilize
these loans and spend more than $800 million each year to obtain them). They provide borrowers
with a guarantee of receipt of their tax refund checks more quickly than the standard receipt by the
IRS. Id. at 371 (refund checks are delivered typically in two days as opposed to ten to fourteen days
if obtained through the standard IRS delivery). The average annual interest rates for these loans
range from 67% to an astronomical 774%, depending on the total amount of the refund check. Id.
For an average $2,500 loan, the resulting APR would likely range from 85% to 170%. Fox, supra
note 18, at 137. Still, the poor and the unbanked may have more of a market for these services
precisely because they may be less likely to file online returns and to specify a bank for deposit of
the refund, both of which would likely speed the refund process.
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Initial Regulation: Some State Law Examples for Auto Titles and
Payday Loans
1. Auto Title Loans

Fringe providers target those that are more likely to use their
services than traditional banks. 21 That alone, however, is unremarkable.
Therefore, the question remains whether the state and federal
governments should implement regulation to protect individuals from
such practices. Before considering that issue later in the Article, it is
important to first recognize that this industry already has had regulation,
particularly at the state level, which is sometimes well planned, but
usually sporadic.
As a general matter, auto-title loans are a source of credit for
millions of Americans. 22 In an auto-title loan transaction, a borrower
receives a one-month loan at a higher interest rate and gives the lender a
security interest in a vehicle.23 As of 2007, the issuance of auto title
loans was legal in about half of the states within the United States.24
Some of these states have deregulated rates for licensed lenders, whereas
others have legislation permitting triple-digit annual interest rates for
title loans. 25 In some states, title lenders use loopholes or operate under
other lending laws to avoid punishment for illegal behavior. 26 Auto-title
loans have been an issue for policymakers concerned with individuals
using what, in many cases, is their primary asset and only means of
transportation as collateral for a loan.27
2. Refund Anticipation Loans
Refund anticipation loans (RALs) have also been problematic.
RALs, however, need not be a large concern because several federal
agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the FDIC,
took actions in 2010 and 2011 that effectively have left only one bank,
working with just two national tax preparation services, to provide this
form of loan. 28 As such, there may no longer be any banks available to

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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Hawkins, supra note 18, at 537-38.
Id. at 538.
Fox, supra note 18.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Hawkins, supra note 18, at 538.
In August 2010, the IRS stopped providing tax preparers and banks with the Debt

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
ARTICLE 1_EMERSON_WORD (DO NOT DELETE)

8

AKRON LAW REVIEW

4/5/2013 4:49 PM

[46:01

offer refund anticipation loans during the 2012 tax season. 29
3. Payday Loans
Most states permit high-cost payday lending practices. Eighteen
states have prohibited or set very strict caps on interest rates for payday
lending institutions, while thirty-two states have allowed such practices
with varying regulation. 30 Indeed, many states allow payday lenders to
charge triple digit interest rates or have no rate cap at all.31 According to
the Consumer Federation of America, Missouri tops the list with an
amazing Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”) of 1,950% on a loan in the
amount of $100 with a two-week maturity. 32 While this is the only four
digit interest rate, several states have no caps at all, including Delaware,

Indicator, a service helping lenders check the credit of taxpayers. See Press Release, Consumer
Fed’n of Am., Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr, End in Sight for Quickie Tax Loans: Latest NCLC/CFA
Report Documents Twilight of the Refund Anticipation Loan (Feb. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/2011-RAL-press-release.pdf. Later in 2010, the Office of Thrift
Supervision and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency both issued directives prohibiting
MetaBank, the likely loan partner for Jackson Hewitt (the second largest tax preparation firm), and
HSBC, the lending bank partner of H&R Block (the largest tax preparation firm), from offering
refund anticipation loans. (In 2010, H&R Block ended its contract for tax refund anticipation loans.
Kristina Peterson, Now Private Company, Jackson Hewitt Plans to Still Offer Tax Loans, DOW
JONES NEWSWIRES (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://www.advfn.com/nasdaq/
StockNews.asp?stocknews=RBCAA&article=48768284). In February 2011, the FDIC notified the
three remaining state-chartered banks making these loans that offering such loans without the Debt
Indicator from the IRS is an unsafe and unsound practice. Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. As a result,
two of the three banks announced that they would no longer offer loans after the 2011 tax season,
while the third bank appealed the decision in the courts. Id.
29. Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 28. Jackson Hewitt and Liberty Tax are now the
only two national tax preparation companies that may offer the loans provided by Kentucky-based
Republic Bank & Trust, a unit of holding company Republic Bancorp Inc. (RBCAA). Id.; Peterson,
supra note 28. Refund anticipation checks (RACs) will still be available, at a cost to customers who
temporarily open a bank account simply for the purpose of receiving a tax refund payment, but these
services are relatively cheap (a fee of approximately $30), offered by traditional banks, and
presumably could even lead to more of the unbanked deciding instead to save some money shortterm (avoiding the RAC fee) and perhaps also long-term by opening a regular bank account. Nat.
Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 28.
30. See PayDay Loan Consumer Information: Legal status of Payday Loans by State,
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/state-information (last visited Dec. 14,
2012). These numbers have held remarkably steady for the past decade, with just one more state
prohibiting payday lending in the past 11 years or more. See Gregory Elliehausen & Edward C.
Lawrence, Payday advance credit in America: An analysis of consumer demand 5 (McDonough
School of Business, Georgetown University, Monograph No. 35, 2001), available at
http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/CRC/pdf/mono35.pdf (noting that 17 states effectively prohibit payday
lending through strict interest rate ceilings).
31. PayDay Loan Consumer Information: Legal status of Payday Loans by State, supra note
30.
32. Id.
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Idaho, Nevada, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. 33
In contrast, the states that bar extremely high-cost payday lending
do so through various methods. 34 For example, states have applied their
small loan rate caps to those operating payday outlets, resulting in a
prohibition of such lending altogether. 35 Also, states with less regulation
related to interest rates may provide statutory limitations through other
methods, such as by limiting the total loan amount or the number of
allowable rollover transactions. For example, Florida permits an APR of
419% for a fourteen-day $100 loan; however, the maximum loan amount
is $500 with no rollovers permitted. 36 A limit on the number of
rollovers may be an especially valuable tool for protecting consumers, as
the rollover transactions often constitute the process that allegedly
entangles borrowers in a trap of indebtedness. 37
Several states, including Arkansas, New Jersey, and New York,
have limited loans through the application of their usury laws, which
dictate the interest rate that can be charged for lending money. 38 Thirtyseven states and the District of Columbia have a payday loan act or a
small loan statute specifically addressing payday loans. 39 These
enactments are much more specific than the respective states’ general
usury laws; they apply to payday loan lenders directly. 40 Still, many
fringe banking outlets have attempted to evade usury laws by claiming
that they are not extending credit or offering loans. 41 For example, Betts
v. McKenzie Check Advance of Florida, LLC, explains how fringe
lenders characterize “deferred presentment” as a service for a fee instead
of a loan charging interest. 42 Fringe lenders describe the transaction as
the lender simply holding the check, giving the customer cash, and

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. PayDay Loan Consumer Information: Legal status of Payday Lending by State: Florida
State Information, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/state-information/17
(last visited Dec. 14, 2012).
37. Hawkins, supra note 5, at 1398.
38. PayDay Loan Consumer Information: Legal status of Payday Loans by State, supra note
30.
39. Payday Lending Statutes, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG. (July 11, 2012)
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking-insurance-financial-services/payday-lending-statestatutes.aspx.
40. Id.
41. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 596.
42. Betts v. McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC, 879 So.2d 667, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
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promising to refrain from cashing the check for a period of time. 43 In
exchange for its promise to not cash the check, the fringe lender extracts
a fee from the customer as consideration.44 Fringe banking outlets
classify the transaction as a whole service and the fee extracted as
consideration for the service, rather than a charge of interest. 45
Moreover, the ability of fringe banking outlets to evade, if not
usury laws, 46 more general supervision, was enhanced by deregulation of
the consumer credit marketplace during the 1980s and 1990s.47
Furthermore, since most of the advertisements for these fringe lenders
focus on the quick and easy cash aspect, they generally do not contain
any “trigger terms” 48 that would require them to state the APR under the
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). 49
It is likely that states will continue to enact additional, payday loan
legislation. As of December 7, 2011, bills were pending in twenty-eight
state legislatures.50 In 2011, eight states enacted legislation: Arkansas,
Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and

43. See id. at 669.
44. Id.
45. Id. Payday loans have also been called “cash advance loans,” “check advance loans,”
“deferred deposit checks,” “delayed deposit checks,” and “postdated check loans.” See 12 C.F.R. §
226(2)(a)(14) (2000); see also Austin v. Ala. Check Cashers Ass’n., 936 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Ala.
2005) (referring to payday loans as “deferred presentment transactions”).
46. A number of courts have rejected a fringe banking firm’s attempt to avoid usury
restrictions. See, e.g., Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 956 (E.D. Ky. 1997); Austin v. Ala.
Check Cashers Ass’n., 936 So. 2d 1014, 1026-27 (Ala. 2005); Betts,928 So. 2d 1204; White v.
Check Holders Inc., 996 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Ky. 1999). However, commentators have concluded that
most state usury laws do not restrict, for example, payday lenders. See Frank Burt, Farrokh
Jhabvala, Jason Kairalla & Ari Gerstin,. Refund Anticipation, Payday, and Auto Title Loans: A
Survey of Select Fringe Lending Products, JORDENBURTLLP, 14-17 (2006), available at
http://www.jordenburt.com/attachments/489.pdf.
47. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 596 n.28 (discussing the general rationale for
deregulation to include proper disclosure and letting the market dictate price).
48. When used in advertisements, certain terms, such as the rate of interest or finance charges
and member fees, act as triggers, which require further disclosure from the lender to the consumer.
See David A. Basil & Christian G. Koelbl, Credit Advertising and Related Matters, in AM. BAR
ASS’N, TRUTH IN LENDING (2003 Supp.). For instance if a lender advertises a 1% monthly finance
charge, that “triggers” further disclosure. Under the Truth in Lending Act, that lender must then
disclose the APR, any minimum, fixed, transaction or activity charge, and any membership fee. Id.
49. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 226.16 (discussing the general disclosures necessary with
respect to advertising using certain terms). See Truth in Lending Act & Advertising: General
Information, IN.GOV, available at http://www.in.gov/dfi/2595.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).
50. Payday Lending 2011 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG., available at
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=22197 (last visited Dec. 14, 2012); see also Payday Lending 2010
Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=19600 (last visited Dec. 14,
2012) (showing that 26 legislatures had payday loan bills in 2010, with ten of the states enacting
such laws).
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Wisconsin. 51 While legislators will continue to take various approaches
as to the best way to regulate this particular fringe service, some
commentators believe that states need to do much more to protect
consumers from the presumably outrageous practices of some fringe
lenders. 52 In contrast, some commentators believe that payday lending
is a necessary evil and not allowing consumers access to such loans
could lead consumers to face significant problems beyond merely paying
a high interest rate, such as foreclosure, eviction, and bankruptcy. 53
C.

Federal Regulation: The Dodd-Frank Act and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau

Even greater than the continued state legislative efforts against
payday lending and the effective end to most refund anticipation loans is
the federal government’s actions to protect consumers and regulate
financial services. In 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),
which was the largest financial overhaul since the Great Depression.54
The stated purpose of the Act is to “promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices, and for other purposes.” 55 The Act spans 2,300 pages
and creates regulation for a large number of consumer and commercial
financial products. 56
Especially important for the regulation of fringe products is the
creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) under
Title X of the Act. 57 The Bureau began operation on July 21, 2011 and
has the authority to regulate nearly all consumer financial products,
affecting over $14 trillion in consumer debt and services. 58 The CFPB’s
mission is to “make markets for consumer financial products and
51. Payday Lending 2011 Legislation, supra note 50.
52. Fox, supra note 18, at 146–49.
53. See Richard Hynes, Payday Lending, Bankruptcy, and Insolvency, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 607, 615 (2012).
54. B. Rush Smith III, Thad H. Westbrook, & Sarah Nielsen, Litigation Implications of the
Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act, 2010-Sept. BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1–5 (2010).
55. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
56. Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial Protection
Act’s “Abusive” Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 119–20 (2011).
57. Id. at 119.
58. Id.
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services work for Americans, whether they are applying for a mortgage,
choosing among credit cards, or using any number of other consumer
financial products.” 59 The Bureau plans to “promote fairness and
transparency” 60 for financial products and services and “set and enforce
clear, consistent rules that allow banks and other consumer financial
services providers to compete on a level playing field and that let
consumers see clearly the costs and features of products and services.” 61
Prior to the creation of the Bureau and the passage of the DoddFrank Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had the authority to
prohibit actions by financial service providers that were deemed unfair
or deceptive under the Federal Trade Commission Act. 62 However, the
language of the Dodd-Frank Act now provides that the federal
government can prevent these providers from engaging in “abusive acts
or practices.” 63 Some argue that this term is too broad of a standard with
little to no guidance as to its scope and exact definition. 64 Others state
that there is a history of the use of the term in recent federal provisions
that provide guidance as to what constitutes an abusive practice.65
Commentators contend that a practice which will fall within the category
of abuse is the extension of high-risk credit without assessing each
borrower’s ability to repay the loan. 66 If this opinion proves accurate, it
is the fringe lenders, themselves, who will be especially at risk of
regulation and discipline by the Bureau unless their practices change.
D.

The Opposite Perspective: The Necessity of Fringe Products

Despite the negative reputation of fringe banking services, the
providers of such services offer something of value that many
individuals would not otherwise be able to access. Payday lenders allow
individuals to borrow small sums of money with quick repayment terms,
a service that typically is unavailable via traditional banks, even for
those with strong credit ratings. 67 For families that are financially
59. Learn
About the
Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
REGISTER,
https://
60. Consumer
Financial
Protection
Bureau,
FEDERAL
www.federalregister.gov/agencies/consumer-financial-protection-bureau (last visited Dec. 14,
2012).
61. Id.
62. Lee, supra note 56, at 119.
63. Id. (quoting Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Barr, supra note 18, at 124-25.
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strapped, a small loan may be the money needed to survive—as an
economic unit—for a short period of time. 68 For example, a small loan
can increase a consumer’s general welfare “if the money is used to
purchase a durable good, like a car or washing machine, that provides
the consumer with a present-value savings compared to the alternative,
such as periodic payments for mass transit or taxis or using a
laundromat.” 69 In addition, for many people that use these services, it is
their only source of legal credit. 70 Although loans from these providers
are expensive, the payment of fees may be preferable to repossession or
late fees incurred from failure to pay a bill. 71
The ease of obtaining funds from fringe bankers is the dominant
attribute pushing sales. For example, an advertisement for National
Cash Advance proclaims, “[w]hatever the situation, getting a cash
advance of $100 or more . . . is quick, easy, and hassle free. Simply
write us a personal check. We’ll advance you the cash today and hold
your check until payday.” 72 While such an advertisement surely
overstates the simplicity of the transaction, individuals in need of a loan
would likely find the process to be quicker and easier than with a bank.
Indeed, that is certainly the reason why many small businesses also
obtain fringe loans. 73
III. FRINGE BANKING DEMOGRAPHICS AND UNCONSCIONABILITY
A.

The Demographics of Fringe Consumers

For a variety of reasons, individuals in low-income households tend
to be the most common customers of fringe services. According to the
United States General Accounting Office, approximately fifty-one

68. Charis E. Kubrin, Gregory D. Squires & Steven M. Graves, Does Fringe Banking
Exacerbate Neighborhood Crime Rates?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY 437 (2011).
69. Alan M. White, Credit and Human Welfare: Lessons from Microcredit in Developing
Nations, 69 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1093, 1106 (2012); see also Edward C. Lawrence & Gregory
Elliehausen, A Comparative Analysis of Payday Loan Customers, 26 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 22,
299, 302 (2008).
70. Hawkins, supra note 5, at 1363.
71. John Jagerson, Fringe Banking and Cash America International (CSH),
TRADINGMARKETS.COM (May 13, 2010, 03:55 PM), http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/
stocks/how_to/articles/Fringe-Banking-and-Cash-America-International-CSH-78055.cfm.
72. Stegman & Faris, supra note 9, at 8.
73. Thomas A. Durkin, The Impact of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency on Small
Business 18-19 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Markets Competitiveness, Sept. 23, 2009),
available at http://www.uschamber.com/reports/impact-consumer-financial-protection-agencysmall-business
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percent of adults earning less than $15,000 per year and thirty-six
percent of adults making between $15,000 and $30,000 per year do not
have a basic bank account.74 According to the FDIC, this practice
results from insufficient financial education, high fees associated with
banking, and inaccessibility to “mainstream” loans. 75 In addition, many
individuals feel as though they simply do not have enough money to
make a bank account worthwhile. 76
As advertised online, providers attempt to express their motivation
as genuine concern for those that are in a “cash dilemma.” 77 The
advertisement lists making a critical math mistake while balancing the
checking account or having a “big” commission check delayed a week
as examples that may cause a borrower to be in a cash bind.78 However,
use of fringe services is most prevalent among the unbanked and lowincome individuals. 79 Therefore, it is most likely a rare borrower that
uses fringe loans to rectify bank account mistakes or to cover delays in
receiving a large payment.
For business owners and entrepreneurs, acquiring funds through
bank loans can prove equally as difficult as for individuals with poor
credit history, as many traditional lenders will be hesitant to extend
credit to a business without a strong business credit record. 80 This is

74. Perez, supra note 1, at 1594.
75. Letter from Jonathan Mintz, New York City Dept. of Consumer Affairs, to Sheila Bair,
Chairman of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (June 6, 2010), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dca/downloads/pdf/dca_letter_to_fdic_060610.pdf.
76. Ellis, supra note 7.
77. Why Use an Online Payday Loan Service?, PRIVATE FAST CASH,
http://privatefastcash.com/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).
78. Id.
79. This point does not mean that unbanked and low-income individuals do not effectively
manage their money. There is actually empirical literature to the contrary. See Ronald J. Mann,
After the Great Recession: Regulating Financial Services for Low- And Middle-Income
Communities, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 729, 740-41 (2012). According to some commentators,
“households that use alternative financial services are in fact pretty good managers of their
money . . . [and low-income] households do an admirable job of balancing use and payments among
the various credit accounts they hold.” Id. Accordingly, the prevalence of fringe banking services
does not indicate a prevalence of poor money management by the unbanked or low-income.
80. Tracy L. Penwell, The Credit Process: A Guide for Small Business Owners, FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, http://www.newyorkfed.org/education/addpub/credit.html (last
visited Dec. 14, 2012). See infra notes 176–178 and accompanying text (discussing the Small
Business Administration data indicating that franchisees have not been relatively successful
compared to other businesses and that loans to franchisees in fact have high default rates); ROGER
D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 35 (2005) (noting that the
data reveal that “business failure is a fact of life . . . just as true for franchisors and franchisees as it
is for other players in the economy;” concluding, “franchising is no safer on average than
independent business ownership, and in some cases is actually more risky”).
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especially true depending on a business’s stage of development. 81
Without access to the financial resources for continuing operations and
making improvements, businesses suffer a higher risk of death: with
inadequate finances, these businesses often fold.82
B.

Unconscionability: Skepticism about Fringe Lenders’ Practices

Fringe banking practices have come under heavy scrutiny. Most of
the criticism center around notions of fairness: that fringe service
providers are acting unconscionably in terms of the individuals they
target and the interest rates charged.83
1. Targeted Locations
Reports indicate that the one factor most strongly associated with
the ratio of fringe provider locations to the total number of financial
service providers is poverty: the greater a county’s poverty rate, the
higher the market share of fringe providers. 84 The prevalence of fringe
providers in low-income locations appears to indicate that the providers
are well aware of their target market and intentionally choose to operate
in such areas. Additionally, individuals without bank accounts are prone
to the use of fringe products and are largely undereducated, with
approximately sixty-nine percent of unbanked individuals having only a
high school education or less. 85
2. Outrageous Interest Rates Charged to the Poorest Consumers
Not only do fringe bankers often market their products to low81. Penwell, supra note 80. Penwell discusses four different stages of development in an
individual’s business and suggests that only those in the third or fourth step in development are in a
position to approach a traditional lender for a loan. Id.; see also Durkin, supra note 73, at 2 (noting
that the newness, small size, or inexperience of a franchised business make it very difficult to get
any financing).
82. Id. In its latest survey (August 2012), the National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB) reported that one in five small business owners seeking to meet credit needs were
unsuccessful in having all their needs met. Small Business Economic Trends, NAT’L FED’N OF
INDEP. BUS., http://www.nfib.com/research-foundation/surveys/small-business-economic-trends
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (finding that 31% of those surveyed reported that all of their credit
needs were met, with seven percent reporting that not all of their credit needs were –satisfied—the
remainder were not interested in borrowing or did not answer the question). The survey is limited
to the perspective of members of the organization, and the survey provides no indication as to the
methods by which credit was obtained by business owners. Id.
83. Hawkins & Mann, supra note 15, at 857.
84. Mahon, supra note 4.
85. Perez, supra note 1, at 1594.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
ARTICLE 1_EMERSON_WORD (DO NOT DELETE)

16

AKRON LAW REVIEW

4/5/2013 4:49 PM

[46:01

income individuals, 86 but, to make matters even worse, those persons
with the least income pay the most for their financial services. 87 To
exacerbate the issue, a flood of legislation during the 1990s and early
2000s left many payday lenders exempt from state usury laws. 88 In an
attempt to curb what some see as a predatory practice, or a structural
problem, national regulation in the form of consumer protection has
been proposed. 89 As of recent, states have been more aggressive in
trying to curb fringe lending by attempting to cap the extremely high
interest rates of fringe lenders 90 to ensure that those lenders cannot make
a profit on short-term loans. 91
Despite these efforts, and given the recently difficult economic
times, fringe lending is flourishing. 92 An individual receiving a net
annual income of $12,000 can expect to pay $250 a year for these
services to cash his paycheck. 93 The interest rates paid by these same
individuals for small loans further illustrate the financial burden these
services place on those that are barely making ends meet.94 An
individual who receives a payday loan will likely pay 470% APR, 95 an
astronomical figure when considering the much lower interest rates that
traditional banks charge to their account holders. 96 Over time, an over
86. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
87. However, given the high risk of such loans, it seems rational that they would have to pay
higher rates.
88. Hynes, supra note 53, at 625.
89. James H. Carr and Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview at 8, FANNIE MAE
FOUNDATION (2001), available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/text_document_summary/
article/relfiles/hot_topics/Carr-Kolluri.pdf (discussing the need for enhanced enforcement of
consumer protection laws and improving borrower education regarding loans).
90. Lynn Cowan and Isabel Ordonez, Short-term Lenders Seize the Day: Shares Rise for
Pawn Shops and Firms Offering Payday Loans as More Borrowers Head Their Way, WALL ST. J.,
Oct.
19,
2011,
at
C4,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203658804576639431624988572.html?mod=WSJ_SmallBusiness_LEFTTopSt
ories.
91. Hynes, supra note 53, at 625.
92. Id. at 608. Small businesses are a large percentage of the fringe banking customer base,
and an even higher percentage of the total dollars lent. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Use
and Government Regulation of Title Pledge Lending, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 425, 449 (2010)
(noting that small businesses constitute up to about 30% of the title loan customers and an even
higher percentage of the total dollars lent).
93. Perez, supra note 1, at 1597.
94. Id. at 1598.
95. Id.
96. Dan Weil, 3 ways to get a small-business loan, BANKRATE.COM,
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/personal-finance/3-ways-to-get-a-small-business-loan-1.aspx (last
visited Dec. 14, 2012) (noting that interest rates for bank loans to small businesses—typically less
than the 8% to 15% rate for online loans—are typically at the lowest rate offered, with many banks
having established reputations as trustworthy lenders).
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indebted individual could be thrust into default by repeatedly borrowing,
even if in small amounts.97
To a certain extent, lenders must charge a steep interest rate to
account for the relatively high risk of default when dealing with
individuals that have a poor history of repayment. However, fringe
lenders ordinarily do not use credit histories to consider customers’
abilities to repay. In effect, these lenders do not require proof of
repayment ability and instead rely upon a postdated check or other
collateral. 98 Indeed, their behavior may be considered predatory
lending, with these creditors having made little or no effort to assess a
borrower’s credit history while intentionally targeting geographic areas
whose demographics indicate a population disproportionately filled with
potential customers that have a poor or nonexistent credit record.99
Given these circumstances, the lenders must be estopped to deny that all
their customers should be charged a high interest rate as a matter of the
creditor’s use of market differentiation (between high credit risk
customers and lower risk customers). Undoubtedly, the differentiation
in price charged to customers is not so much internal (i.e., varying
within a particular fringe banking company, depending on the customer),
so much as it is simply traced to an “external” distinction between those
customers who obtain their financing from the fringe banking entity
itself and those who can and do bank with a more traditional institution
(e.g., a bank or credit union).
While lenders could be required to evaluate borrowers based on

97. White, supra note 69, at 1108.
98. Barr, supra note 18, at 166; Hawkins, supra note 5 at 1394, 1401 (stating, “Lenders
report payday loans to Teletrack, a credit bureau for fringe credit transactions, and lenders check
Teletrack before extending loans to ensure potential borrowers have not taken out other payday
loans”; further noting that that fringe lenders “use means other than credit history to ensure
repayment,” with those methods including collection via collateral or a future paycheck).
As fringe banking outlets loan only small amounts to customers, the average fringe banking outlet
has little time or money to gather a consumer’s financial information and to conduct a background
search on the customer’s financial condition; those expenses in time and money outweigh the
potential costs savings from weeding out high risk customers. Search costs also likely prevent
fringe bankers from splitting their customer pool into different risk categories and charging distinct
interest rates for each risk pool. Indeed, fringe bankers might in part be hedging their risk among
the entire customer pool by charging all customers exorbitant interest rates. Hawkins, supra note 5,
at 1399-1400.
99. HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED: LIFE AND DEBT IN THE FRINGE ECONOMY 11
(2005) (“While risks exist—as in all industries—they are mitigated by loan collateral, excessive
markup in prices, and the socialization of losses among a class of borrowers. Put another way,
enough people will make good on their payday loans to compensate for the bad ones—not difficult,
given the extremely high industry-wide profit margins. In short, industry claims about the high
risks associated with serving marginal populations are exaggerated.”).
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their ability to repay the loan, as would a traditional bank, this would be
a challenge when dealing with the typical borrower. For example, most
individuals that use fringe lending services do so due to poor credit,
which creates an inability to borrow from traditional banks. As a result,
fringe lenders cannot not use an individual’s credit rating as a tool to
evaluate a borrower’s ability to repay a loan. Most ratings of borrowers
would likely be poor and would exclude lenders from providing loans to
the vast majority of these individuals. Additionally, evaluating a
borrower on the basis of income may prove an ineffective tool for
Some lenders have
assessing the probability of repayment. 100
recognized the issue with lending solely based on credit scores and these
lenders have adjusted their practices to include other considerations,
such as cash flow. 101 While this practice may not help the typical fringe
borrower, it surely would help potential franchisees with no previous
franchise or brand experience.
3. Oversimplified Marketing Campaigns
Perhaps fringe bankers’ marketing campaigns, coupled with their
arguably unconscionable interest rates and targeting of low-income
individuals, furnish additional grounds for scrutiny. One advertisement
stipulates that the use of a payday loan service allows borrowers to save
money, save their credit, and save face. 102 The evidence seems to
indicate that individuals using fringe services will pay large fees and
annual interest rates between 100% and 500%. 103 The advertisement,
therefore, would lead a borrower to believe that using a payday lending
service will save her money when compared with having to incur fees
100. One report indicated that the typical borrower had an annual income of up to $50,000.
Stegman & Faris, supra note 9, at 15. Some commentators might find it unfair to allow a fairly
illiquid or perhaps nearly insolvent individual with an annual salary of $50,000 to obtain a loan and
not the individual making $30,000 per year even if that individual is in a better financial position
overall. While salary may be one tool to analyze the likelihood of repayment, it surely falls short of
a complete analysis. The individual making less annually may have fewer financial obligations and
be in a better position to repay the loan than the individual who has a greater salary. A formula that
encapsulates this idea and thus better assesses an individual’s likelihood of repayment, is: Effective
Gross Income (EGI) plus Other Investments/Collateral minus Total Obligations equals Net Income
(ability to repay).
101. Robb Mandelbaum, Providing Loans Based on Cash Flow, Not Credit Score, N.Y. TIMES
(May
5,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/business/smallbusiness/
06sbiz.html?ref=paydayloans.
http://payday-loan-service102. Payday
Loans
Review,
TOPTENREVIEWS,
review.toptenreviews.com (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).
103. HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED: LIFE AND DEBT IN THE FRINGE ECONOMY xiii, 5
(2005).
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associated with a late bill payment. 104 Similarly, the advertisement
appeals to the borrower’s concern for his credit, as it states that
obtaining a payday loan will prevent an individual from receiving “bad
marks” to his credit record by paying a bill after its due date.105 This
reasoning is backwards, as many users of fringe products obtain a fringe
loan due to a poor or nonexistent credit rating, not for the purpose of
protecting the rating. 106 Finally, the advertisement appeals to borrowers’
emotions: suggesting that a payday loan can protect borrowers’ personal
and business relationships by helping borrowers avoid asking relatives
or friends for money. 107 While most would agree that asking for a loan
from a family member or a friend can be embarrassing, 108 the
advertisement seems to unnecessarily invoke fear in individuals strapped
for cash. 109 By way of comparison, in Australia, “the credit squeeze has
forced new franchisees to borrow from their parents, family and friends
to get into business;” 110 if Aussies can do that, why should Americans
shy away? 111 Indeed, in a difficult economic climate, some franchisors

104. Payday Loans Review, supra note 102.
105. Id.
106. Indeed, the payday loan may just make things worse. Consider a small business and its
recurring transaction costs for a payday loan:
(1) Typically it is advanced 10%–15% of the company’s average monthly revenue;
(2) The loan is personally guaranteed by the owner;
(3) Every thirty days the costs occur again; and
(4) For a year-long arrangement, the business would incur $1,200 in fees on a $1,000
loan.
Payday Loans & Your Biz: Payday Loans Can Ruin Your Credit and Cost You Dearly in Interest
and Hidden Fees, MSN BUSINESS ON MAIN, http://bom.msn.com/Article.aspx?id=26643792 (last
visited Dec. 14, 2012).
In sum, “Borrowing money from a payday lender—especially for business—is like walking into
quicksand. The longer you’re in the hole, the deeper you sink into debt and despair.” Id. (emphasis
added).
107. Payday Loans Review, supra note 102.
108. Of course, family members or friends may not be an available source of funds for the
simple reason that these persons have no more access to funds or credit than does the franchisee.
JOHN P CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 68-77
(1994).
109. Zywicki, supra note 92, at 454–55 (discussing survey results as well as social and
psychological issues involved in borrowing money, or not seeking to borrow money, from family or
friends).
110. Claire Heaney, Getting a Franchise Grows Tougher, THE MERCURY (HOBART), Oct. 7,
2010, at 22.
111. Perhaps Australians are inclined to turn to family and friends when they need funds
because they actually understand the alternative in the form of loans that fringe lenders would offer.
Australia’s Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), which was adopted in 1994, is intended to
make Australia’s fringe banking rates transparent to borrowers. Infosys Technologies Ltd., supra
note 7, at 16. Credit providers in Australia are required “to disclose all relevant terms and
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are doing more to line up financing. 112
IV. SMALL BUSINESSES AS FRINGE BANKING CUSTOMERS: THE
FRANCHISEE EXPERIENCE
Car title loans are a product of the ubiquitous “bad credit, no credit,
no problem” advertisements offered by lenders. 113 In exchange for the
small loan that a borrower could not get at a bank, the lender requires a
high interest rate and the title of the borrower’s car as collateral; in
comparison to the already steep interest rates that credit card companies
may charge, car title loans can legally be over ten times higher—as
much as 250% or more. 114 Of course, whether these loans are for
personal debt or for business matters, the amounts owed—and the total
payments expected—can be exorbitant, as borrowers struggle simply to
pay interest while making little headway in reducing the outstanding
principal. For example, a car title borrower paid $400 a month for seven
months ($2800) just to pay off the accumulated interest on her $3000

conditions including annual interest rates before entering into a contract and ensure that borrowers
receive adequate copies of loan documentation. Id. There is also a requirement of disclosure of
annual interest rates in advertisements. Despite the regulation, fringe banking has been a
significantly growing part of the Australian financial sector. Id. at 4 .
112. Sarah E. Needleman, Franchisers Focus on Loans: Amid Weak Small-Business Lending,
Franchisers Help Franchisees Get Loans, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2011, 7:26 PM ET)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903366504576486173595440098.html (reporting,
“Thirty-nine percent of franchisers said more than half of their franchisees and franchise prospects
were unable to obtain needed financing, according to a March [2011] survey of 147 franchisers by
International Franchise Association, a trade group;” in response, some franchisors are taking more
active roles to find financing for their struggling franchisees, and many businesses have formed with
the purpose of connecting franchisees and their franchisor in order to arrange financing). For
example, the franchised restaurant chain Wingstop has had financing arrangements with Franchise
America Finance and The Bancorp Bank—securing $15 million for franchise lending to new and
existing franchisees. Steven R. Thompson, Wingstop Secures $15 million for Franchise Lending,
DALLAS BUS. J. (Dec. 1, 2011, 12:33PM CST), http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/
2011/12/01/wingstop-secures-15-million-for.html. Furthermore, franchisor GNC has also promoted
how it seeks to do as much as possible to provide direct financing to its franchisees. Frequently
Asked Questions, GNC LIVE WELL, http://www.gncfranchising.com/dom_faq.asp#q9 (last visited
Dec. 14, 2012).
113. Christopher Neiger, Car Title Loans a Problem: Fast Cash and Big Problems, AOL
AUTOS (Oct. 14, 2008), http://autos.aol.com/article/car-title-loans/; see also Christopher Neiger,
Fast cash, big problems with car title loans, CNN LIVING (Sept. 26, 2007),
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-09-26/living/title.loans_1_title-loan-interest-rates-responsiblelending?_s=PM:LIVING.
114. In addition to these high interest rates, multiple mandatory fees are standard, thereby
making it that much harder for cash-strapped borrowers to escape the piling debt. Car Title Loans a
Problem, supra note 113 (noting that such fees include processing, document, late, origination, and
and lien fees).
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loan. 115 After those grueling payments she was still at square one, with
the full loan to pay back. 116 Indeed, this outcome is the ordinary result
of loan terms “crafted to keep borrowers in a cycle of debt and bring
customers either to the verge of repossession or to actual
repossession.” 117
The horror stories are not limited to a particular type of loan.
Besides auto title loans, payday loans, with nearly $11 billion lent online
in 2010, 118 serve as an economic “lifeline.” 119 Just as often though,
these payday loans serve as a debt sentence. Ramon Zayas had bills
piling up from the treatment for his prostate cancer, so Zayas and his
wife decided to take out a $250 loan from 500 FASTCASH at a 476%
annual percent interest rate. 120 The money was used in order to pay the
Zayas’ electricity bill, and Ramon Zayas believed he was paying off the
loan. However, confusing fees and enormous rates transformed his
payments to $125 a month (half of the original loan). 121 While Zayas
thought he would be paying, in effect, thirty percent interest while
paying off the loan within a few months, 122 he actually paid far more
interest than principal.123 Despite the fact that eighteen states have
proscribed payday lending, 124 500 FASTCASH and over two dozen
other online payday lenders have been shielded from state laws because
they are owned by American Indian tribes. 125
A.

The Effects of Regulation on Consumers

When considering regulation of fringe services, we must
contemplate the effect on individuals and businesses that rely on the
credit obtained thereby. If regulations restrict access to these services,
many people will be without a form of credit when they desperately need
it to survive. 126 Even those that support the regulation of abusive

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Armen Keteyian, How “payday” lenders pull off crippling rates, CBS EVENING NEWS
(Sept. 26 2011, 7:16 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-20111913.html.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (“I borrowed $250 [and] thought I was going to pay $325,” Zayas said).
123. Id. (Zayas ended up paying $700 on a $250 loan, “but it would have been $1,100 had
[he] not gone to the bank and put a stop to this”).
124. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
125. Keteyian, supra note 118.
126. Hawkins, supra note 5, at 1363.
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practices acknowledge that it is likely to harm the “economically
disadvantaged disproportionately,” due to their already limited access to
loans. 127 The irony of such regulation is that it is purported to protect
individuals and businesses from the potentially harmful practices of
financial providers, yet the regulation itself may cause more harm than
good to those who are most in need. 128
Consider whether fringe lending actually produces financial
distress. 129 Many fringe banking products (rent-to-own, pawning of
goods, and title lending) are structured so that borrowers can “escape”
their debt by walking away and only losing the equity they put in as well
as their collateral. Most loans are for small amounts and, in pawn shops
especially, the negative consequence from losing the collateral is often
emotional rather than financial, such as losing a family heirloom, yet
losing access to such a loan could cause financial distress by not being
able to use the money (e.g., the pawnbroker’s loan) to pay off other bills
and debts. 130 Though structured differently from other fringe banking
products, payday loans still operate in a similar manner in that loan
amounts are capped at a relatively low number: the amount of a
biweekly pay check. 131
Perhaps there could be alternative sources of credit. For consumers
these sources might be: loans from family and friends directly, use of
credit cards to finance bills and purchases, home equity refinancing
(assuming the consumer owns a home), and offering a family member’s
or friend’s guarantee on a traditional loan. Further methods of credit
could be the buying of inventory or equipment with a purchase-money
security interest, 132 having corporate owners provide personal guarantees
on loans, the offering of unencumbered assets as collateral, and, in the
worst case scenario, filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy and obtaining credit
during reorganization.133 If consumers and businesses have already
127. Lee, supra note 56, at 121.
128. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 14-15 (2011). The Dodd-Frank Act and creation of the
Bureau will likely lead to an increase in litigation against financial service providers, as the Bureau
has the authority to pursue a civil action for violation of the federal consumer financial laws. Smith,
Westbrook, & Nielsen, supra note 54, at 5. In addition, these providers are likely to be subjected to
more civil or administrative actions based on the consumer protection regulations that the CFPB
promulgates. Id.
129. Hawkins, supra note 5, at 1386–98.
130. Id. at 1390.
131. Id. at 1394.
132. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1478 (9th ed. 2009) (defining purchase-money security
interest).
133. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2010).
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exhausted the above sources, they may have no alternative to fringe
financing. Consumers and small business owners in a financial crunch
ordinarily will have little or no knowledge or other resources to pursue
alternate credit sources, nor will they have time to educate themselves
about more sophisticated forms of credit.
Perhaps a reason alternative credit sources are not utilized by
individuals is because they prefer the fringe banking products’ more
convenient environment than for mainstream institutions. 134 At any rate,
the formal alternatives, such as bank loans, are usually unavailable to
pawn shop customers because they would not, with their credit ratings,
qualify for a loan. 135
There is evidence that customers of fringe outlets feel as though
these businesses meet their needs better than mainstream institutions. 136
One focus group report indicated that check cashers were superior to
banks with regard to their access to immediate cash, locations, service,
respect of the customer, and trustworthiness.137 More interestingly,
some focus group members indicated that the pricing policies of check
cashers were more transparent than the policies of banks. 138 These
individuals valued the ability to use check cashers without any
obligation to continue a relationship on the part of the borrower. 139
Thus, the focus group illustrates that there are aspects of fringe lending
services that are appealing, regardless of the high fees that may be
charged. The consumer preference for these services must be considered
when determining the appropriate levels of regulation for fringe banking.
If lenders provide cash for individuals in genuine emergency
situations, and do not simply prey on debtors’ chronic mismanagement
of funds, it is arguable that they should not be subject to more
regulation. Assisting those in need in times of crisis or when an
unexpected expense occurs is a worthy service, with the sole principal

134. Timothy Bates & Constance R. Dunham, Introduction to Focus Issue: Use of Financial
Services by Low-Income Households, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 3, 4 (Feb. 2003) (citing DAVID CAPLOVITZ,
THE POOR PAY MORE 34 (1963)). In order to fight the convenience of fringe banks that are check
cashers, grocery stores and “regular” banks increasingly have acted as alternatives—the stores
providing check cashing free to their customers and the banks cashing checks free of charge if the
check originated from that bank. See Ebonya Washington, The Impact of Banking and Fringe
Banking Regulation on the Number of Unbanked Americans, 41 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 106 (2006).
135. CASKEY, supra note 108, at 70. Even if pawn shop “banking” is a market reality, there
may be useful reforms of its operations.
136. Stegman & Faris, supra note 9, at 13.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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objection being the price of the service. 140 This is especially so when
these individuals in crisis have no other practical source to obtain
cash. 141
Greater regulation may result in fewer fringe providers. If a
consumer obtains funds outside of fringe banking, she might be driven to
independent loan sharks with the stereotypical bat in hand enforcing
interest rates that are likely unregulated. As for approaching family
members and friends, hat in hand and begging for cash, clearly that can
be detrimental to one’s self worth and personal relationships. 142 In
addition, this alternative presumes that one has family members and
friends available and that those individuals are in a financial position to
be able to lend.
In the business context, business owners might be hesitant to
provide further personal guarantees or offer their own possessions and
homes as collateral for loans when they might already be loaded down
with other debts. To take away the alternative financing available
through fringe banking is to remove some businessperson autonomy and
perhaps even induce criminality. 143 Indeed, the alternate sources of
credit might trigger more damage to small business debtors or to
consumers than fringe financing produces. 144

140. At that point, we may be in the position of the old joke about prostitution or any other socalled victimless crime that, once you accept even the lightest variation from an absolute, moralsbased prohibition, then all you are doing is arguing over price.
141. For example, fringe banking outlets may be the sole, legitimate stopgap measure to
financially distressed consumers. See supra Part II.A.
142. For general information about seeking business financing, see Asheesh Advani, Deciding
Whom to Ask for Money, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/83792 (last
visited Dec. 14, 2012).
143. Todd J. Zywicki & Astrid Arca, The Case Against New Restrictions on Payday Lending,
ON
POLICY
3
(Jan.
2010),
available
at
MERCATUS
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/MOP64_FMWG_Payday%20Lending_web.pdf(no
ting the possibility of a rise in illegal loan sharking controlled by organized crime, such as what
happened in Japan following a 2006 tightening of consumer lending regulations).
144. The unavailability of fringe providers could drive consumers to less desirable, and
possibly even illegal, options. See e.g., Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 WASH. & LEE. L.
REV. 979, 1004 (2012) (discussing generally how excessive debt can harm one’s welfare). One
such undesirable choice, resorting to pawn shops, imposes costs on the debtor “comparable to
payday loans, but [with the borrower required] to part with personal property to use as collateral.”
Zywicki & Arca, supra note 143, at 2. Also, “because of the small size ($76 on average) and high
transaction cost of pawn shop loans, these are of limited usefulness in managing financial
difficulties.” Id. at 2-3.
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Consider the Franchisee
1. Fringe Banking Services Franchisees and Their Own Financing

Perhaps the best ways to determine a fringe lender’s true
perspective on its loans is to see its response to the use of such loans by
individuals or entities in which the lender has a vested interest. For
example, many fringe banking outlets are owned and operated as a
member of a franchise network. 145 If the fringe lenders truly believed in
their product as a credible source of financing and not a precarious,
overpriced loan, presumably they would allow their franchisees to utilize
such services to obtain some or all of the funds necessary to purchase the
franchise right.
The example of Cash Plus, Inc. may prove instructive. Cash Plus
provides check cashing, payday advance loans, and other financial
services, 146 and it posts extensive information on its website regarding
its franchise opportunities. 147 While its standard franchise agreement
does not specifically prohibit the use of fringe financing to acquire
franchise purchase funds, the contract does state that the “method of
payment specified by Franchisor may include Automated Clearing
House (ACH) direct electronic bank debit system, certified check, bank
or other financial-institution check or any other method as Franchisor
may designate.” 148 It seems clear that the franchise agreement
anticipates that payments from the franchisee will be made in the most
formal way through a standard bank transaction. Interestingly, while its
website states that its customers have been “underserved by banks,” the
franchisor, as a business, acknowledges the necessity and credibility of
standard bank payments. 149 Such a clause for most or all fringe banking

145. See, e.g., FAMILY FINANCIAL CENTERS, http://www.familyfinancialcenters.com/ (last
visited Dec. 14, 2012).
146. CASH PLUS, http://www.cashplusinc.com/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
CASH
PLUS,
147. Cash
Plus
Franchise
Info
Franchise
Facts,
http://www.cashplusinc.com/franchise_info_ffacts.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
FREE FRANCHISE DOCS,
148. Sample
Franchise
Agreement, CASH PLUS,
http://www.freefranchisedocs.com/cash-plus-inc-Franchise-Agreement.php (last visited Dec. 14,
2012).
PLUS,
149. Cash
Plus
Franchise
Info
Franchise
Facts,
CASH
http://www.cashplusinc.com/franchise_info_ffacts.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2012). A fringe
banking franchisor targets a different audience in franchise agreements than in its product
advertisements. Perhaps the franchisor expects a higher level of financial stability and
sophistication in its franchisees than in its product customers. So, while that difference in approach
between franchisee “customers” and actual fringe banking customers may sound ironic or even
hypocritical, the more exact payment terms in the franchise agreement may merely reflect the
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service franchisors is highly likely, as contract provisions strongly and
almost universally in favor of a franchisor have long been the norm in
American franchising. 150
2. Franchisees’ Use of Fringe Banking
While much of the discussion surrounding fringe banking practices
focuses on individual consumers’ use of such products, the business
community is not immune from the uses of and issues associated with
fringe banking. For example, business owners may need fringe lending
services to cover unforeseen expenses or to fill the gap if receipt of a
payment is delayed. With the typical start-up business requiring, on
average, about $25,000, 151 a loan providing a few thousand dollars may
serve a vital role in allowing the entrepreneur to get off the ground. That
may especially be the case for franchising, where different sources often
can be cobbled together to help the debtor-franchisee commence
operations, even if any particular source of funds is problematic. Such
sources could be the franchisor itself, a traditional bank, a credit union, a
landlord, and third-party suppliers. 152 Another potential financing
avenue for franchisees is to seek a franchise-funding specialist. Doing
so typically involves companies that have a relationship with particular
lenders specializing in franchise financing. 153 Alternatively, if the
franchisor allegedly misled, or at least negligently informed, the
franchisee about her estimated start-up costs, then the franchisee could

franchisor’s trying to attract more financially stable franchisees rather than the franchisor’s
exhibiting a distrust of its own products for consumer debtors.
150. See, e.g., Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor’s Duty of
Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C.L. REV. 905 (1994) [hereinafter Emerson, Franchise
Contract Clauses]; Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-Standard
Approach (2012) (forthcoming) (on file with author) [hereinafter Emerson, Franchise Contract
Interpretation].
151. SCOTT A. SHANE, THE ILLUSIONS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE COSTLY MYTHS THAT
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND POLICY MAKERS LIVE BY 79–80, 95 (2008) (noting three
studies from the late 1990s arriving at figures of $15,000, of $20,000 or of $22,700; estimating the
start-up total to be “$24,920 in today’s dollars”).
152. See W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE §§4:4–
4:16 (2012) (describing the franchisee-landlord relationship, third-party suppliers and financing, and
guarantees, pledges, and inventory as well as other forms of financing).
153. Jeff Eglin, 3 Sources of Franchise Financing: Know How to Make Sense of the Current
Economy and Its Impact on Fringe Banking, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 3, 2008),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/198310.
Typically these companies will obtain your
financials, advise you as to your lending options, and help you throughout the lending process
without charging a fee unless you actually receive the loan. Id.
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successfully sue the franchisor for that wrongful disclosure. 154 In fact,
when securing Small Business Administration (“SBA”) loans, several
franchisees have been hurt by their franchisors’ overly optimistic
financial projections. 155
Statistics indicate that access to high-cost credit such as auto title
loans is an important aspect of the success of small business. 156 Indeed,
most small businesses use consumer lending to help finance their
business, as these often are more expensive, 157 but faster and more
convenient sources of credit. 158 Consumer lending can cover everything
from seed capital for starting a business to the management of monthly
cash flows, in addition to providing working capital.159 As one
economist specializing in the regulation of consumer financial services
has noted, “[m]any of these businesses [that obtain “consumer”
financing] do not have access to a commercial line of credit, often
because they are too small or too new.” 160 Even those businesses that
can get the more traditional business financing use consumer loan
products to supplement their commercial credit.161 In fact, small
businesses make up twenty-five to thirty percent of the customer base
for title loans, and an even higher percentage of the total dollars
loaned. 162
C.

Lost Opportunities for Franchisees

Many prospective franchisees, looking to purchase the rights to
operate under an established franchise system, can find startup costs
under $10,000. 163 For franchises such as Jazzercise, Inc., and Stratus

154. David A. Beyer & Scott P. Weber, Estimated Initial Investment Claims: Strict Liability or
Strictly Folly?, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 103, 104 (2000).
155. Don Sniegowski, Advice on SBA Liar Loans, BLUEMAUMAU.ORG (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/10713/part_3_lenders_give_advice_sba_liar_loans
(advising
franchisees to verify franchise numbers and to engage in due diligence before taking out franchise
loans).
156. Durkin, supra note 73, at 2.
157. Id. at 19.
158. Zywicki, supra note 92, at 449. Professor Zywicki explains why small businesses, such
as landscapers, plumbers, and handymen, may go through a series of high-in-transactional-costs,
short-term loans pledging a motor vehicle title. Id. at 448–49.
159. Durkin, supra note 73, at 2.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Zywicki, supra note 92, at 449.
163. 2012 Low-Cost Franchises: 100 franchises for under $50,000: Top 10 Low Cost
Franchises for 2012, ENTREPRENEUR, available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/
lowcost/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2012). For all franchised systems, not just those with low start-up
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Building Solutions, two low-cost franchises (with startup costs as low as
$3,000 to $3,500) ranked within the top thirteen franchises according to
Entrepreneur Media, 164 there is the potential to use fringe loans for
filling any gaps in capital. A fringe loan, perhaps from an auto title loan
or a payday advance, could provide a franchisee with the potential to
operate her own business when she would otherwise not have the
funds. 165 The financing of even a small amount could be a real key to
success for someone seeking to join an accomplished, often lucrative
business network (franchise system)—someone (the franchise applicant)
not normally thought of when considering the fringe banking industry
and its traditional customers.166 Recent data tend to show that while
small business lending has increased, small business owners are still
having problems obtaining nominal loans ($150,000 or below) to get
their businesses started. 167 This is precisely the issue that potential
franchisees face because these are the types of loans they need to
procure to start-up their businesses.
These figures, however, do not to say that franchisors play no part
in helping franchisees obtain financing for their start-up costs. Some
franchisors hire executives specifically dedicated to assisting franchisees
obtain loans and also pay for services that match franchisees with
lenders. 168 Given the recent recession and inability to get credit, some
franchisors have been more aggressive than ever in helping franchisees
costs, the initial franchise fee that the franchisee must pay the franchisor (a part of the start-up costs)
is a median charge of $20,000. BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 80, at 59.
available
at
http://
164. 2012
Franchise
500
Rankings,
ENTREPRENEUR,
www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/rankings/franchise500-115608/2012,-1.html (last visited Dec. 14,
2012).
165. Perhaps this has led to more franchisors directly extending financing to their franchisees.
See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 156–162 and accompanying text (on small business financing, such as
through auto title loans). As small businesses increasingly have turned to cash advances when
banks have turned them down, a proposal has been the Small Business Lending Enhancement Act
of 2011 (S. 509), currently in committee. This bill would amend the Federal Credit Union Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795k (2011) and thereby permit many credit unions to expand considerably the
credit they make available via member business loans. It would certainly assist in having some
small businesses, including franchisees, avoid fringe lending and obtain more traditional, safe,
sound, and lower-cost loans. See The Small Business Lending Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 509,
112th Cong. (2011).
167. Emily Maltby, Small-Business Lending Jumps, But Credit Struggles Linger, WALL ST. J.
(Oct.
5,
2011
1:24
p.m.
ET)
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203388804576612950561189010.html?mod=WSJ_SmallBusiness_sections_Fi
nancingAndInvesting (discussing the incentive banks have to approve higher loans due to the
amount of work needed to process loans and limited number they can approve).
168. See Needleman, supra note 112 (discussing the various methods that franchisors use to
help franchisees secure loans).
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obtain financing, including direct financing from the franchisor.169 Due
to faith in the franchise model, lenders in fact often require less due
diligence when assessing a franchisee’s ability to repay. 170 However, the
presumption that franchises are a safe bet has been recently dispelled, in
strong fashion, by the high default rates on SBA-backed loans for
franchisees. 171 Consequently, lenders are scrutinizing franchise loans
more carefully now than they have in the past.172 Indeed, some
franchising experts comment that franchisors need to be extremely
careful about lending so that new business operators-owners can buy
into their system: these experts blame some franchisors’ business
difficulties on the franchisors’ putting efforts into expansion through
financing of franchisees rather than concentrating on the success of the
existing operations. 173
Use of fringe products by business owners and franchisees is
amplified by the difficulty in obtaining credit through standard means.174
For instance, recent data show that small business lending has been on a

169. Kermit Pattison, Tight Credit Is Turning Franchisors Into Lenders, N.Y. TIMES (June 9.
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/business/smallbusiness/10sbiz.html?ref=franchising
(also mentioning other ways that franchisors are helping franchisees, including reducing royalties,
fees, or other general requirements).
170. But see BMM, SBA Rebukes Banco Popular for Liar Loans, BLUEMAUMAU.ORG (Aug.
12, 2011, 11:22 AM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/10628/sba_rebukes_banco_popular_liar_loans
(discussing franchisee defaults on SBA loans due to lack of credible information and lender
oversight).
171. Infra note 188 and accompanying text.
172. Don Sniegowski, SBA Franchise Lenders Hit, BLUEMAMAU.ORG (Sept. 30, 2011, 1:29
AM),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/10727/national_franchise_lenders_hit_hard_change_model
(discussing how SBA lenders were harmed by franchisee loans and the steps they are taking to
correct past mistakes).
173. See, e.g., April Y. Pennington, Financing Facts: Is it tougher to find franchises that
finance? ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 15, 2003), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/66044 (comments
of Professor Scott Shane that Boston Market’s bankruptcy issues arose in large part from the fact
that the franchisor “became a finance company and not an operating company”). For discussion of
the use of experts in franchise dispute resolution, see Robert W. Emerson, Expert as
Ringmaster: Amplifying Arguments in a Franchising Dispute (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
174. That may especially be the case in light of the poor economy for the past few years.
Even in a good economy, there are a number of reasons why a particular business might find credit
hard to obtain: (1) banks’ unwillingness to carry an additional high risk borrower on their lending
portfolios; (2) for a start-up business, difficulties in obtaining a thorough credit history; and (3) for a
going concern, a borrowing business might already have collateralized its assets to secure previous
debts, or it has inventory already encumbered by other purchase money debts, or the owners might
have already personally guaranteed too many previous debts (a new lender would have no first or
even second priority position). In sum, the inability to get credit stems from there being too little
information to evaluate a new business and too little, if any, possible collateral for lending to a
going concern.
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steady decline. 175 Moreover, franchise loans, in general, do not seem to
ensure protection for the franchisor or the franchisee, at least vis-à-vis
loans for other business formats; while all business loans from 2001–
2006 had a failure rate of 5.9%, franchise loans actually failed at a
higher rate of 6.5%.176 These figures should not be surprising, however,
as at least one study has shown that franchisees actually average a
business failure rate higher than that of independent businesses. 177
Although there is a plethora of law discussing “sophisticated
franchisees,” 178 no court has specifically delineated the distinction
between these franchisees and their unsophisticated counterparts. 179 The

175. Small Business Lending Declines, BLUEMAUMAU.ORG (Oct. 14, 2011, 9:57 AM),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/10778/small_business_lending_declines; see also Small Business
Lending in the United States, 2009-2010, OFFICE OF ADVOCACY (U.S Small Business
Administration), Feb. 2011, at 3, available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/
sbl_10study.pdf.
176. Laura Tutor, The It List: Companies on the Small Business Administration’s Franchise
Registry have Lower Loan Failure Rates than National Average, QSR MAG., available at
http://www2.qsrmagazine.com/articles/features/108/sba-1.phtml
(reporting
statistics
from
FRANdata President Darrell Johnson, including, inter alia, that the rate of charge-offs and loan loss
for Small Business Administration Franchise Registry companies is lower than business as a whole,
with loans coming through the Franchise Registry having a rate of 5.7%).
177. Timothy Bates, A Comparison of Franchise and Independent Small Business Survival
Rates, 7 SMALL BUS. ECON. 377 (1995); Timothy Bates, Analysis of Survival Rates Among
Franchise and Independent Small Business Startups, 13 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 113 (1995). Bates
observed a 34.7% failure rate for franchised business over a five-year span, but only a 28% rate, in
the same time period, for independents.
178. One example would be Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. v. Dynamic Pizza, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d
740 (W.D. Ky. 2004). There, the defendant franchisees, having been sued for breach of a franchise
contract, counterclaimed against Papa John’s for fraudulent inducement, specifically, that false oral
representations by a representative of Papa John’s caused the premature closing of defendant’s
restaurants. Id. at 744. The parties, two corporations, entered into a number of franchise
agreements during their transactions, which contained merger and integration clauses that provided
that the written agreement contained the entire agreement between the parties and superseded all
prior understandings or agreements. Id. at 744. The court held, “if any misrepresentations
fraudulently induced Defendants into entering the Development Agreement, i.e., misrepresentation
made prior to the signing of the agreement, the merger and integration clause prevents this action
from being brought.” Id. at 745. The court placed emphasis on the fact that the contract had been
agreed upon by two sophisticated parties. Id.; see also Owens v. Cumberland Mortg., Inc., No.
1:05-CV-135R, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83667, at *13–14 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 16, 2006) (distinguishing
Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. v. Dynamic Pizza, which involved mutually sophisticated parties, and
thereby holding that unsophisticated home mortgagors could assert their claim of fraud against the
sophisticated business defendant, a mortgage brokerage).
179. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. Three examples of cases in which courts
found against franchisees claiming franchisor fraud, at least in part because of the franchisee’s own
sophistication, are: Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, 970
F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that business people who purchased a franchise as an
investment opportunity were sophisticated franchisees); North Am. Fin. Group, Ltd. v. S.M.R.
Enters., Inc., 583 F. Supp. 691, 698 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that a franchisee with a background in
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law’s presumption (or at least a number of court findings on the facts)
that franchisees are generally “sophisticated” can be understood in light
of some general requirements for becoming a franchisee. For instance,
the APlus® franchise lists several requirements that it expects potential
franchisees to have, including the ability to make and implement a
business plan along with a minimum investment of two hundred and
fifty thousand dollars. 180 While this is just one example, one could argue
that an individual needs a certain level of sophistication before entering
into such an agreement.181 The FTC Franchise Rule and some state
statutes allude to such a distinction.182 As noted in the revised FTC
Franchise Rule, there is a “sophisticated franchisee” exemption that frees
franchisors from the need to provide disclosure to sophisticated
franchisees. 183 Nonetheless, the Rule does not explicitly define a
“sophisticated franchisee.” 184 A California statute also attempts to make

investments was sophisticated); Payne v. McDonald’s Corp., 957 F. Supp. 749, 761 (D. Md. 1997)
(finding a franchisee sophisticated due to its extensive knowledge of the franchisor’s business).
Two examples of courts holding in favor of franchisees that might be deemed “unsophisticated” are
Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting the inequality in
power generally favoring franchisors over franchisees, as well as the “substantially weaker
bargaining position” of the franchisee vis-à-vis the franchisor in that particular case—a franchisee
with a yearly salary of around $100,000, someone who had “never owned her own business,” versus
a franchisor parent company with over $208,000,000 in assets and over one billion dollars in
revenues), and Fisher v. Mr. Harold’s Hair Lab, Inc., 527 P.2d 1026, 1034 (Kan. 1974) (discussing
the unequal bargaining power of the parties). See also AM. JUR. 2D PRIVATE FRANCHISE
CONTRACTS § 260 (1990) (discussing that franchisee may not be able to claim reasonable
reliance when franchisee is a sophisticated investor).
180. Sunoco
APlus®
Franchise:
Franchise
Requirements,
SUNOCOINC.COM,
http://www.sunocoinc.com/retail/partner-with-sunoco/franchise-requirements (last visited Dec. 14,
2012).
181. All franchise agreements, of course, involve business relationships and, as such, are
distinguishable from consumer contracts, which receive stricter review by the courts in favor of the
consumer. All prospective franchisees must understand that would be opening a business and
taking a risk. Their willingness to take the risk is probably, but not always, supported by analysis of
and reflection upon an array of information available from the franchisor in making their decision to
own and operate a franchise. For more analysis of franchisees and sophistication, see Emerson,
Franchise Contract Interpretation, supra note 150, at 34-40; Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and
the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author).
182. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444
(Mar. 30, 2007) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436-37) (2009) [hereinafter, FTC Disclosure
Requirements and Prohibition]; GARNER, supra note 152, at § 5A:32 (discussing state exemptions in
which (1) the franchisee is experienced in that business, Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS §
445.1506(1)(h) (2010)), or (2) the initial minimum investment of a franchisee is $750,000,
Maryland (MD. CODE REGS. tit. 02, § 02.02.08.10E (2010))).
183. Infra note 227 and accompanying text.
184. See David J. Kaufmann, The New York Franchise Act, 2007–2008, 20 MCKINNEY’S
GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 33 (2009). Notably, the FTC Rule does not explicitly enumerate this as
the “sophisticated franchisee” exemption but rather states that a franchisee who has “been in
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the distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated franchisees
with respect to disclosure requirements of franchisees by denoting such
franchisees as “experienced” rather than “sophisticated.” 185
As discussed above, 186 franchise applicants may not have the
chances to acquire and then successfully build upon a business
opportunity. Surely an advanced judicial, regulatory, and contractual
(i.e., franchisor) approach to sophistication could produce better
financing and greater opportunities for potential franchisees.187
D.

The Importance of Insulating Businesses from Consumer-Oriented
Protections

Seemingly, with every chance for profit comes as well the prospect
of litigation. There are many ways that financing, or a lack thereof, can
cause franchise disputes. One can easily foresee controversies in the
financing of franchise investments if, generally, the franchising concept
fails or if, in particular, the business for one or more of the franchisees
fails, such as due to a stream of revenue that simply is insufficient to
repay loans, especially high-cost fringe loans. If defaults are likely to
occur, and perhaps even to be exacerbated by fringe lending, then it
could be argued that the franchisees’ use of fringe loans should be
limited or monitored to ensure repayment. The cost of such monitoring
should not be much, as an assessment of repayment ability should be
undertaken, anyway, by the franchisee and franchisor in consultation
with one another. The franchise relationship itself could provide
protection for franchisees, with less need for governmental oversight of
financing arrangements. 188 For instance, a franchisor usually should
business for at least five years and has a net worth of at least $5,424,500” is exempt from the
disclosure requirements under the Rule. 16 C.F.R. § 436.8(a)(5)(ii) (2007).
185. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31106 (West 2009) (defining “experienced franchisees” and applying
that definition to the initial sale of a franchise to sophisticated buyers).
186. See supra notes 167 &174-174 and accompanying text.
187. All franchises can be summarized as contractual relationships between a franchisor and
franchisee. This business relationship is distinguishable from consumer contracts that receive
stricter review by the courts in favor of the consumer. Surely all franchisees understand that they
are opening a business and will be taking some sort of risk. The requirements to be a franchisee are
too variable to sum up into basic requirements. A vague statement can be made asserting that
usually a franchisee must be sophisticated enough to satisfy each individual franchisor’s specific
requirements, but more research would be needed to support a more specific statement. See infra
note 207 and accompanying text.
188. Needleman, supra note 112. But see OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INSPECTION &
EVALUATION DIV., (U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.), SBA’S EXPERIENCE WITH DEFAULTED FRANCHISE
LOANS
2 (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter Inspector General Report], available at
http://archive.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba/oig_bllo_2-27.pdf (commenting on the
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have fixed contractual duties to ensure that prospective franchisees meet
the minimum standards for success. 189 These duties should include, in
general, dealing with franchisees in good faith, as well as, more
specifically, providing franchisees with supervision, training, know-how,
and various acts of periodic assistance.190 As for the standards, they
might include, for example, balance sheet targets, solvency or profit
requirements, and market-share goals. The franchisor’s duties would be
aimed at apportioning responsibilities fairly between the franchisor and
franchisee as they jointly seek to achieve their ambitions for the
franchising network.
There are also good consumer guide resources that may help
potential franchisees focus on important aspects of the franchise
relationship, and thereby reduce the need for governmental oversight. 191
These consumer guides provide comprehensive information regarding
the benefits and responsibilities of potential franchisees, including the
common sense suggestion that a franchisee engage in due diligence and
research her prospective franchisor.192 Additionally, franchisors can
impose on potential franchisees higher requirements, such as a larger
initial down payment. 193 Assuming that more franchisors follow this
model and expect more—financial or otherwise—from their franchisees,
the franchisee is encouraged to take more self-protective measures, as
she has more at stake (more sunk costs in time and money).
Furthermore, the franchisee also may get more financial oversight
because she may choose to bring in outside lenders, such as fringe
banking, to meet her rising costs.
With extensive regulation and policing of fringe markets on the
horizon as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act, 194 the impact on small

incentive franchisors have to collect franchising fees by embellishing a franchisee’s financial
projections to help underqualified franchisee’s obtain SBA loans).
189. See AM. ASSOC. OF FRANCHISEES & DEALERS, FAIR FRANCHISING STANDARDS 38
(1996-2012), available at http://www.aafd.org/images/pdf/AAFD-Fair-Franchising-Standards.pdf
[hereinafter AAFD Fair Franchising Standards].
190. Id. at 37-38.
191. See Buying a Franchise: A Consumer Guide, FTC BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION,
http://business.ftc.gov/documents/inv05-buying-franchise-consumer-guide (last visited Dec. 14,
2012).
192. Id.
193. Emily Maltby, Want to Buy a Franchise? The Requirements Went Up, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
15, 2010, 4:45 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704361504575552803956439716.html (discussing some franchisor
requirements including good personal financials, strong industry experience, and a higher initial
down payment).
194. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
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businesses must be considered. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has
stated that businesses’ use of these high-cost loans is a reason to oppose
regulation. 195 According to a bulletin published by the Federal Reserve
in 2006, small businesses, which include nonfarm entities with 500 or
fewer employees, created sixty to eighty percent of net new jobs
annually over the previous decade. 196 With such a significant role to
play, the CFPB must be careful not to impede the ability of small
businesses to obtain all the credit they need.197 Moreover, in the
franchisor-franchisee relationship, the presence of an outsider—a thirdparty lender—can help, immeasurably, the franchisee, particularly
inasmuch as the lender requires some comprehensive analysis of a
franchise’s prospects. In turn, the lender is engaged in its own review of
the franchise purchase. The franchisor’s role in helping the franchisee,
therefore, suggests that less regulation of fringe lenders is needed
because the franchisor itself can create a safety buffer, helping the
franchisee to make an informed decision and thereby reducing the risks
the franchisee may incur with respect to fringe lending. 198
To understand further why the franchisee’s enlisting of financial
support can be aligned with whatever franchisor support the franchisee
receives, and thus removed from consumer lending protections, consider
what the principal federal regulator of franchising has concluded. The
FTC discussed why the franchisor’s lending of money to the franchisee
is not counted toward the monetary amount ($1 million) for someone to
be a “sophisticated” franchisee to whom a franchisor need not meet the
FTC Rule disclosure requirements. 199 While money from other sources
Stat. 1376-2223 (2010), discussed supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text, and supra note 128.
195. Durkin, supra note 73, at 2-3.
196. Traci L. Mach & John D. Wolken, Financial Services Used by Small Businesses:
Evidence from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances, 92 FED. RES. BULL. 167, 167 (2006).
197. It is important to note that, under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB is empowered to
“regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products and services.” 12 U.S.C.A. §
5491(a). The Act defines “consumer” as an individual or someone acting on behalf of an
individual. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5481(4). Although the Act does not specifically define individual, it
does, however, limit consumer financial products or services to those “offered or provided for use
by consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 12 U.S.C.A. § 5481(5)(A);
see also Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 23, 2526 (2011) (discussing the powers of the CFPB). As such, if the CFPB begins limiting fringe
consumer credit, it will also likely, as a result, limit business credit because consumers make up the
majority of revenue for fringe lenders. That is, unless those fringe lenders can make up this lost
revenue, they probably will eventually fail and will no longer be an option for consumers or
businesses.
198. Pattison, supra note 169.
199. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444,
15,520 (Mar. 30, 2007) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436–37) (2009) [hereinafter, FTC Disclosure
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(besides the franchisor itself) do count, the FTC proclaimed the value of
introducing another experienced, independent party, the outside lender,
into the situation:
[I]t is reasonable to assume that a lender, in order to minimize its own
financial risk, will ensure that a prospective franchisee will conduct a
due diligence investigation of the franchise offering. Indeed, by
involving a lender, the prospective franchisee effectively ensures that
there is an independent, sophisticated entity inserted into the sales
process. This additional safeguard would be lost if sources of
financing for purposes of the exemption included the franchisor and its
200
affiliates.

In effect, the presence of the lender may ensure more protection for
the franchisee in evaluating her franchise investment, and the
franchisor’s involvement may help protect the franchisee from entering
into an unnecessary, overreaching arrangement. The presence of a third
party (the lender, for the franchise relationship; and the franchisor, for
the loan) may be leveraged to help the franchisee. It is win-win, at least
for the franchisee involving both his franchise and his loan. 201
The franchisor looks after the franchisee and its arrangements with
third-party financiers, if for no other reason than it is in the franchisor’s
best interest to do so 202— ensuring that the franchisee is not so
financially strapped so as to hurt the franchisor’s chances for success. 203

Requirements and Prohibition].
200. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444,
15,525 (Mar. 30, 2007) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436–37) (2009) [hereinafter, FTC Disclosure
Requirements and Prohibition].
201. It may also be a win-win for franchisors that have better financed franchisees. See infra,
Part IV, B.
202. In some other areas of the franchise relationship, one could argue that any franchisee
“protection” provided by the franchisor might be suspect. Some issues involved in franchising—the
parties’ disproportionate bargaining power, the uninformed approach of many franchisees, and
matters of contract language, territoriality, and independent contractor status—raise concerns for
which the franchisor’s interests may diverge from the franchisee. See generally Emerson,
Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 150; Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47
AM. BUS. L.J. 191 (2010); Robert W. Emerson, Franchisees Without Counsel: Presumed Competent
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise
Independence: Awaiting Public Recognition (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author);
Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 181.
However, in the restricted area of business finance, the franchisor’s and the franchisee’s interests
coincide. Indeed, franchisors ordinarily have strong incentives to have franchisees with sufficient
financing.
203. See infra note 231 and accompanying text (concerning the alignment of franchisor and
franchisee interests for franchise financing); cf. infra note 232 and accompanying text (noting how
many aspects of the franchise relationship other than financing involve varying, indeed often
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That in turn probably makes it less important that the government
protect the franchisee from fringe banking fiascos, because the
franchisor should assist in that regard. 204 Even if there are rules intended
to protect the franchisee, the FTC’s limited resources make pursuit of a
rule-breaker both rare and, when undertaken, quite likely to be settled.
Franchisees have no cause of action under the Franchise Rule, and they
usually have little hope of successfully challenging franchisor conduct by
filing suits under the “Little FTC” state laws modeled after the Federal
Trade Commission Act.205 That result is because these laws tend to be
rather narrowly drafted, and they have been construed so as not to permit
private actions for claims constituting simply a breach of contract.206
The proposal to depend on franchisor-franchisee oversight of any
outside lending, and thereby to be distinct from consumer finance
regulation, comports with case law. Most courts facing this issue have
held that a franchisee is not a consumer for purposes of his franchise
contract. 207 As pro-franchisee attorneys have long lamented, “[t]he most
frequent barrier to franchisee redress . . . is that a franchisee may not be
‘consumer’ and/or the specific issue being litigated may not be a
‘consumer transaction.’” 208 This outcome is especially troubling in that

directly competing, interests).
204. If franchisees are more informed, they may not need as much protection via regulation,
similar to an “accredited investor” not needing as much securities law protection. See Net Worth
Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No.33-9287, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
89,666 (Mar. 23, 2012). But see Inspector General Report, supra note 188, at 2 (discussing the
incentive that franchisors have to gain as many franchisees as possible in order to obtain royalties
and other fees).
205. See Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise
Relationship, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 105, 280 (2004) (discussing the “little FTC Acts” of various
states); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (2010). Many states permit franchisees to seek recovery from
franchisors under state “little” FTC Acts. Bailey Emp’t Sys., Inc. v. Hahn, 545 F. Supp. 62, 72 (D.
Conn. 1982), aff’d without opinion, 723 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1983).
206. Bailey Emp’t Sys. Inc., 545 F. Supp. at 72.
207. See, e.g., J & R Ice Cream Corp. v. Cal. Smoothie Licensing Corp., 31 F.3d 1259, 127273 (3d Cir. 1994); Meineke Disc. Muffler v. Jaynes, 999 F.2d 120, 124-25 (5th Cir. 1993); Delta
Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 975 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1992); West Coast Franchising Co. v.
WCV Corp., 30 F.Supp.2d 498, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza,
Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 1061-64 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Lui Ciro, Inc. v. Ciro, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 1365,
1387-88 (D. Haw. 1995); Sparks Tune-Up Ctrs. Inc. v. Addison, Civ. No. 89-1355, 1989 WL
73631, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1989); Layton v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 368,
371 (D. Md. 1989); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Whiteman Tire, Inc., 935 P.2d 628, 744-745
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997). As noted in BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 80, at 275, the franchisee is
ordinarily in a position that is as close to the “ultimate” businessperson (the franchisor) than it is to
the actual consumer: “[g]enerally, the courts recognize that the franchisee is a ‘middleman’ between
the franchisor and the ultimate customer.”
208. Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 205, at 280.
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the popular culture, the language used in advertising, and no doubt the
franchisee’s own cognitive biases all point to an emotional conclusion
that the franchisee is really a type of partner with the franchisor as well
as a consumer of the franchisor’s business network and method of doing
business. 209
Occasionally a court will observe that the franchisor-franchisee
affiliation has the attributes of a consumer relationship, with the
franchisee (the consumer) subject to an adhesion contract:
Although franchise agreements are commercial contracts they exhibit
many of the attributes of consumer contracts. The relationship
between franchisor and franchisee is characterized by a prevailing,
although not universal, inequality of economic resources between the
contracting parties. Franchisees typically, but not always, are small
businessmen or businesswomen . . . seeking to make the transition
from being wage earners and for whom the franchise is their very first
business. Franchisors typically, but not always, are large corporations.
The agreements themselves tend to reflect this gross bargaining
disparity. Usually they are form contracts the franchisor prepared and
offered to franchisees on a take it or leave it basis. Among other
typical terms, these agreements often allow the franchisor to terminate
the agreement or refuse to renew for virtually any reason, including the
desire to give a franchisor-owned outlet the prime territory the
210
franchisee presently occupies.

Moreover, while most courts hold that the franchisee is not a
consumer, nor does its transaction with the franchisor constitute a
consumer deal, there are several state unfair trade practices statutes
(Little FTC Acts) under which the franchisee has been found to be a
consumer. 211 The approach under foreign law produces this same result,
with most holding that franchisees are not consumers, hence not

209. Id. at 146, 155.
210. Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sue Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 365, 373 (Ct. App. 1996)
(internal citations omitted).
211. See Scotsman Group, Inc. v. Mid-America Distrib., Inc., No. 93 C 7320, 1994 WL
118458, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 1994); Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 850 (D. Minn.
1989); Luzim v. Phillips, No. 87 C 112, 1987 WL 30214, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1987) (applying
Florida law); Kavky v. Herbalife Int’l of Am., 820 A.2d 677, 678 (N.J. Super. 2003); ATS Se., Inc.
v. Carrier Corp., 18 S.W.3d 626, 626-27 (Tenn. 2000); Nelson v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 762
S.W.2d 744, 746–47 (Tex. Ct. App. San Antonio 1988). But see J&R Ice Cream Corp. v. Cal.
Smoothie Licensing Corp., 31 F.3d 1259, 1266 (3d Cir. 1994); C-B Kenworth, Inc. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 706 F. Supp. 952, 957 (D. Me. 1988); Layton v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp.
368, 371 (D. Md. 1989); Roberts v. Gen. Motors Corp., 643 A.2d 956, 960 (N.H. 1994). For a
discussion of numerous states’ Little FTC Acts, see GARNER, supra note 152, at §§9:34–9:36.
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protected, but with a sizeable minority holding otherwise. 212
Although the franchisee needs protection in many other areas,213 it
seems that the franchisee does not need the protections that come with
being a consumer, at least not to the extent non-franchised, independent
business owners and individuals may need protection. Moreover, the
franchisee, not when compared to the franchisor but when matched up to
others under the Dodd-Frank Act, may be considered relatively
sophisticated. As long as there is: (1) a franchise agreement or manual
specifying procedures for and limitations on the financing
arrangements, 214 and (2) an ongoing “relational” contract between
franchisor and franchisee 215 in which the franchisor can monitor the
franchisee’s financial choices, then the franchisee truly is not on her
own. 216 Therefore, she need not receive the same measure of protection
that is extended to individuals or other, independent small businesses
under the Dodd-Frank Act.
With its limited resources, the CFPB must be encouraged to focus
on those borrowers—ordinary consumers and the small, non-networked,
truly independent businesspersons—who need a regulatory framework.
Despite franchisees’ having a network of private support (their franchise
system) and often a franchisee support system, 217 franchisees can

212. INT’L BAR ASS’N, GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: FRANCHISE 18, 26, 31, 43, 52, 57, 64,
70, 76, 80, 87-88, 94, 102, 109, 117, 124, 129 143 150, 156, 165, 172, 179, 184, 190, 196, 201 & 217
(2012) (franchisees are protected consumers—Austria (sometimes), El Salvador, Germany (if
obliged to purchase goods on a recurrent basis), Guatemala, Italy (sometimes), Japan (sometimes),
Kuwait (sometimes), Mexico, South Africa, Sweden (sometimes), Thailand; franchisees are not—
Canada, China, Finland, France (very unlikely), India, Indonesia, Netherlands (rarely), New
Zealand (rarely), Romania, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
(very unlikely), and Venezuela).
213. Supra notes 202, 208-209 and accompanying text.
214. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 150, at 973-75 (noting that only 10%
of the franchise contracts had provisions in which the franchisor provides assistance to the
franchisee in obtaining financing); Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation, supra note 150
(noting that the percentage of franchise contracts with a financing-assistance provision had risen to
12%).
215. Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 928 (1990).
216. Indeed, it is clear that reputable franchisors often act to keep would-be franchisees from
getting their funding outside of the usual business lending circles.
217. On a national level, there are pro-franchisee groups, e.g., the American Association of
Franchisees and Dealers (AAFD); also, among just the franchisees for that network, often are
independent franchisee associations that could look after members’ interests. See Robert W.
Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1505-06
(1990); Stan Turkel, Independent Franchisee Associations Grow, BLUEMAUMAU.ORG (Nov. 7,
2011, 8:12 AM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/independentfranchisee_associations_infas_rise
(reporting that the number of independent associations of franchisees—presently between 300 and
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succumb to the temptations of costly, ill-considered fringe loans; that
should make all the clearer to policymakers the need to protect the others
(consumers and nonfranchised small businesses) who use fringe banking
products. Indeed, perhaps the most vulnerable users of fringe banking
are those who really are on their own while running a business and,
therefore, as evidence may indicate, deserve the Dodd-Frank Act
protections even more than an individual consumer would.218
E.

Sophistication: Finding Middle Ground Between Consumer Needs
and Business Growth

It is a challenge: striking the appropriate balance between
protecting consumers from egregious, extortionist financial practices and
allowing individuals as well as businesses to retain their ability to obtain
high-cost lending by choice. One key to accomplishing both goals is a
heavy disclosure regime, but a light set of substantive regulations.
Fringe providers could be required to disclose all information
related to their lending in a clear, concise, easy-to-understand format. 219
This disclosure would likely need to take place in a more detailed
manner, something beyond a simple written document, beyond the pro
forma requirements of Item 10 in the Franchise Disclosure Document.220
For many borrowers, it would be advantageous for a lender to discuss
the fees, interest rates, and loan terms orally as well as in writing to
ensure the individual is fully aware of his obligations. If the lender
comprehensively discloses the negative aspects of a loan, the borrower
should retain the right to accept or decline. In an emergency situation, a
borrower may rationally decide to accept the terms of a high-cost loan
despite the drawbacks. 221
Another possible method to ease the burden on franchisees seeking
access to credit would be legislative reform. 222 Just like for consumer

400—is growing, and that franchisee associations recently have won several legal battles over
matters such as standing, use of advertising funds, and damages).
218. To give an example of how increased connections to lending activity does not necessarily
produce better loans or practices, and debtors can still be driven out of business, see Inspector
General Report, supra note 188, at 13–20 (providing many examples of how the lending process
through the SBA did not stave off business failure and may, in fact, have helped to cause it).
219. See Inspector General Report, supra note 188, at 5-6 (providing as a practical
recommendation, for lenders to clearly define what a franchise loan is, and what its general terms
are).
220. 16 C.F.R. 436.5(j). For a proposed disclosure rule concerning a franchisor’s obligation to
disclose fringe financing related information, see infra Part IV.
221. Supra notes 15, 30–52 and accompanying text, concerning payday loans.
222. Franchisees Push Capitol Hill for Help, BLUEMAUMAU.ORG. (Sept. 19, 2011, 9:33 PM),
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lending, business borrowers should be as informed as possible about the
terms upon which each financing is offered. With these increased
disclosures, both business borrowers and fringe lenders could slow
down, investigate each other, and fully discuss the terms of loans; the
borrowers thereby would be better able to exercise choices about
financing. 223
On the contrary, if regulation is strict to the point that fringe
lenders cannot remain profitable, individuals and businesses will lose
access to funds. 224 While consumers should be protected from lenders
that provide false or misleading information, these consumers should be
permitted to make financial decisions for themselves based on their
personal assessment of the costs and benefits.225 Statistics indicate the
demographics of individual, nonbusiness fringe borrowers swing
strongly toward the poor and the less educated, i.e., people who may not
comprehend the magnitude, let alone the specifics, of their loan
obligations even when there are stronger, more comprehensive warnings
and perhaps spot “checkups” by the authorities. 226 It is clear that
regulation would be useful to protect these borrowers from themselves.
However, it is nearly impossible to regulate the borrowing activity of
these individuals, but not that of the business owners and their families
that understand a transaction and freely accept it despite the negative
terms. A fringe lender cannot size up an individual based on her
demographic characteristics and simply withhold loans from those
persons that appear less experienced or intelligent. Franchising rules,
along those lines, have included bright-line standards concerning when
the more dependent party (the franchisee) may not need the usual

http://www.bluemaumau.org/10689/franchise_group_pushes_cantor_fdic_help (discussing the
initiative franchisees are taking to ensure better access to credit and tax reform). Additionally, using
usury ceilings to limit the amount of interest a fringe lender can charge may also help protect
consumers who use these services. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11, at 663–64 (discussing a
possible solution in using usury ceilings to help protect consumers).
223. See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
225. A consumer’s personal assessment, however, is still not without its risks. Research
shows that consumers chronically underestimate financial risks and are overconfident about their
future circumstances; they become, in some cases, “hopelessly optimistic” in regard to paying back
a loan. See generally, Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lending”—A Proposal for
Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 912-13 (2012).
226. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. For example, via periodic, random checks
of posted online information and also of the interactions between lenders’ representatives and
customers, the latter portrayed by a fair lending tester comparable to a fair housing tester or perhaps
a secret shopper.
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protections. 227
Even with standards that say an applicant franchisee, to be
“sophisticated,” must have invested at least a million dollars, which can
be her own savings or money, which she borrowed from anyone but the
franchisor itself, there are unresolved issues. Perhaps this one-milliondollars-plus threshold simply raises more questions about individual
circumstances, especially the source of the prospective franchisee’s
funds: “Did she re-mortgage her residence? Did he borrow from a friend
or relative? Did they cash in their retirement fund? [Also,] what other
assets, liabilities, and income [does] the prospective franchisee ha[ve]
from which one can estimate his or her financial sophistication and
tolerance of risk[?]” 228 Indeed, it has been suggested that, from a
lender’s perspective, a franchisee can fall into one of two categories:
individuals with previous business experience, and individuals with little
experience who are trying to start up a franchise. 229 The former will be
deemed “sophisticated” due to their business experience, while the latter
will have a much harder time obtaining traditional financing because
they are seen as high-risk. 230
There is insufficient evidence that it would be beneficial to impose
the Dodd-Frank Act protections upon franchisees as if they were
consumers. In financing, franchisor and franchisee interests tend to
align, and so franchisees can benefit from the knowledge and assistance

227. Indeed, in franchising, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has long refrained from
adopting a standard that would require franchisors to evaluate the experience and knowledge of
potential franchisees. Instead, the Commission, in amending its Franchise Rule (promulgated in
1978, amended in 2007), stuck with three precise monetary figures establishing which would-be
franchisees do not need to be furnished the information normally required under the Rule:
16 C.F.R. § 436.8(a)(5)(i) (2010) (the “large investment” exemption)—franchise sales where the
prospective franchisee makes an initial investment totaling at least $1 million, excluding the cost of
unimproved land and franchisor financing;
16 C.F.R. § 436.8(a)(5)(ii) (2010) (the “large franchisee” exemption)—franchise sale to ongoing
entities, such as airports, hospitals, and universities, with at least $5 million net worth and five years
of prior business experience;
16 C.F.R. § 436.8(a)(6) (2010) (the “insiders” exemption)—franchise sales to the owners, directors,
and managers of an entity before it becomes a franchisor.
228. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions, supra note 200, at 15, 522–23 (Mar. 30, 2007)
(codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436–37) (2009) (comments of franchisee attorney Eric Karp).
229. Niles Howard, Getting Lenders to Provide Franchise Financing, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov.
16, 2004), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/73860.
230. Id. However, the SBA’s experience with lending to franchisees suggests that franchisees
were defaulting at high rates because of the lending banks’ inability to get credible information;
most franchisees were new and had no business history with that particular brand. See supra notes
155, 170-172, 176 and accompanying text (concerning the comparatively higher failure rate for
SBA-backed loans extended to franchisees).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013

41

Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
ARTICLE 1_EMERSON_WORD (DO NOT DELETE)

42

AKRON LAW REVIEW

4/5/2013 4:49 PM

[46:01

of the franchisor. 231 This is a distinct advantage over other aspects of the
franchise relationship, where the franchisor and franchisee naturally
have varying, if not directly competing interests. Examples of such
issues are encroachment, antitrust law, terminations, and non-compete
covenants. 232 Likewise, one could say that any problem in fringe
banking, at least for a successful business, may be no worse than other
financial issues businesses face, such as for matters of real estate and
credit cards.

V. A PROPOSED DISCLOSURE RULE: FITTING THE ARGUMENT FOR
DISCLOSURE OF FRINGE FINANCING INFORMATION INTO THE EXISTING
MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT
A.

The Materiality Requirement

The amended FTC Franchise Rule 233 provides that franchisors may
not “alter unilaterally and materially the terms and conditions of the
basic franchise agreement or any related agreements attached to the
disclosure document without furnishing the prospective franchisee with
a copy of each revised agreement at least seven calendar-days before the
prospective franchisee signs the revised agreement.” 234 More generally,
though, beyond just the franchise agreement, the rule requires
franchisors to disclose all material information to prospective
franchisees. 235 The number and scope of items that may be material is

231. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 150, at 942 (arguing that franchise
financing is often an area of franchisee dependence on the greater experience and knowledge of the
franchisor, who is better suited to either furnish funding for the franchisee or obtain excellent
financing through the franchisor’s contacts); Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation, supra
note 150 (noting how franchisors’ and franchisees’ interests can be aligned concerning arranging the
funding to start a franchise).
232. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contracts and Territoriality: A French Comparison, 3
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 315, 339-41 (2009); Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, supra note
202; Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Goodwill: Take a Sad Song and Make it Better, 46 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 349 (2013); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Termination: Legal Rights and Practical
Effects When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor Discriminates, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 564-70
(1998); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Territories: A Community Standard, 45 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 779, 779-80 (2010); Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and Consumers’ Beliefs About “Tied”
Products: The Death Knell for Krehl?, 45 FLA. L. REV. 163, 165-73 (1993); Robert W. Emerson,
Franchising Covenants Against Competition, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1049, 1053-93 (1995).
233. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 16 C.F.R. § 436
(2007).
234. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(b) (2010).
235. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FRANCHISE RULE COMPLIANCE GUIDE ii (2008), available at
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substantial. Indeed, the FTC “considers every required disclosure in a
disclosure document to be material.” 236
Although materiality is thus crucial, the amended FTC Franchise
Rule does not define the term “material” because the FTC considers its
jurisprudence, particularly that concerning violations of Section 5 of the
FTC Act, 237 to be sufficient guidance.238 For franchise matters, the FTC
has decided, materiality can be determined by “the reasonable
prospective franchisee standard.” 239 Regulators and courts alike apply
an objective test of what a reasonable person would consider important
in deciding to purchase a franchise.240
The amended rule does outline certain required disclosures the
franchisor must make to the franchisee. These disclosures include, inter
alia, the franchisor’s business experience, its litigation or bankruptcy
history, information relating to fees and initial investment, restrictions
on products, the franchisee’s obligations, and financing. 241 Within the
finance related disclosures, the franchisor must disclose the terms of the
financing agreement, including what the financing covers, the interest
rate, the payment period, and the number of payments, among other

http://business.ftc.gov/documents/franchise-rule-compliance-guide (stating, “Like the original
Franchise Rule and the UFOC Guidelines, the amended Rule requires franchisors to give
prospective franchisees material information, including background information on the franchisor,
the costs of entering into the business, the legal obligations of the franchisor and the franchisee,
statistics on franchised and company-owned outlets, and audited financial information.”).
236. Joseph Y. Adler & Michael R. Laidhold, Assessing Materiality in Franchise Disclosure
Documents: A Canada-U.S. Analysis, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 245, 248 (2011).
237. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012). The definition of “material” used by the FTC has also been
built upon the definition used in federal securities law: whether the misstatement or omission
“might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of
deciding how to vote.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970); see also TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality under a “substantial
likelihood” test—a substantial likelihood that (1) “under all the circumstances, the omitted fact
would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder,” or, to
phrase it differently, that (2) “the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”).
238. Federal Trade Commission: Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunities; Final Rule, 1 72 Fed. Reg. 15444, 15455-56 (Mar. 30,
2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/01/R511003FranchiseRuleFRNotice.pdf.
239. Id. at 15455. In this sense, the FTC still follows the materiality standard expressly stated
in the original FTC Franchise Rule, promulgated in 1978: materiality is “any fact, circumstance, or
set of conditions which has a substantial likelihood of influencing a reasonable franchisee or a
reasonable prospective franchisee in the making of a significant decision relating to a named
franchise business or which has any significant financial impact on a franchisee or prospective
franchisee.” 16 C.F.R. §436.2(n) (2004) (repealed by the amended FTC Franchise Rule, 16 C.F.R.
§436 (2007)).
240. See Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1432 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
241. 16 C.F.R. 436.5(g)(7)(ii).
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items. 242 In addition to these items, the franchisor must disclose any
additional material financing terms. 243
B.

Mutual Benefits of Disclosure

The franchisee typically is linked with a larger, more experienced
business, the franchisor, that bargains on behalf of the franchisee and
offers better incentives 244 to traditional lenders than an independent
business could offer. 245 Often the franchisor has existing credit
relationships with traditional banking institutions that the franchisee
could utilize.246 That fact may be especially important as franchisees—
who typically have used their own credit resources (e.g., credit cards)
more than those of traditional lenders such as banks—face more
restricted and less available credit for personal lines of credit. Although
sometimes the interests of the franchisee and franchisor will be at odds,
it is in the interest of both parties that the franchise succeeds. 247
This franchisor-franchisee mutuality of interest is a result of the
business relationship, not of law. 248 The FTC Rule’s mandated
disclosure about financing only applies when there is a financing
“arrangement” between the franchisor and the franchisee. 249 If the
franchisee obtains outside financing, there are no financing related items
to disclose. For most franchisees, that effectively means no financing
disclosures need be provided. Relatively few franchisees obtain

242. 16 C.F.R. 436.5(j).
243. 16 C.F.R. 436.5(j)(1)(x).
244. E.g., guarantees.
245. In fact, given the tight credit situation, franchisors may have to provide franchisees with
more financing options. Cecilia M. Falbe, Ajith Kumar & Dianne H.B. Welsh, Franchisee Use Of
Bootstrapping: An Exploratory Study Of Financing Decisions, 7 SMALL BUS. INST. J. 63, 67-68
(Oct. 2011) (finding that new franchisees relied on their own credit and personal loans to finance
their business; further noting that with the tightening of credit by credit card companies many
potential franchisees will be locked out of a typical source for business startup funds).
246. See Darrell Johnson, Thank the Banks! (What?): Banks are Helping Franchising Win the
UPDATE,
http://www.franchising.com/articles/
Competition
For
Credit,
FRANCHISE
thank_the_banks_what_banks_are_helping_franchising_win_the_competition_for_.html
(last
visited Dec. 16, 2012); Kermit Pattison, Tight Credit Is Turning Franchisers Into Lenders, N.Y.
TIMES (June 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/business/smallbusiness/10sbiz.html.
247. See supra notes 202, 231, and accompanying text.
248. If it has a legal origin in addition to simple business or economic self-interest, the ties
between the franchisor and franchisee arise most fundamentally through the contract that they have
reached.
249. 16 C.F.R. 436.5(j)(1) (the franchisor must “[d]isclose the terms of each financing
arrangement. including leases and installment contracts, that the franchisor, its agent, or affiliates
offer directly or indirectly to the franchisee.”).
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financing directly from the franchisor, 250 and, indeed, the franchise
relationship probably does offer the franchisee more avenues of
obtaining credit than what may be available to an independent
Franchisees seem to be better protected by their
business. 251
relationships with their franchisors as compared with independent
businesses, which likely have fewer champions or larger entities vested
in their success.
A thorough disclosure of financing possibilities may increase the
franchisee’s likelihood of success, which benefits the franchisor as well
in the form of a steady income stream (i.e., royalties, fees, network
expansion and the resulting initial payments for new franchises). A
successful franchisee supports the sustenance and growth of her
franchisor’s operations and in turn prevents the franchisor from
incurring the costs of finding, training, and starting a new franchise to
replace a failed franchisee. Given the presence of the FTC’s disclosure
requirement, 252 it is hardly a burdensome step to require the franchisor to
provide disclosures relating to financing needs that might arise in the
future, including information on the risks and benefits of obtaining
financing from fringe sources. If franchisors disclose information about
fringe banking and the potential that a franchisee may need to turn to
fringe banking in the course of its business, the franchisor-franchisee
relationship is strengthened. 253 The franchisee is made aware of the
potential need for and risk involved in fringe banking, and the franchisor
protects itself from any potential future recourse in the form of
disclosure. Moreover, with greater protection in the franchisorfranchisee relationship, regulators are free to create and enact legislation
that protects the true “consumers,” i.e., individuals, while still allowing
for a more deregulated environment with lower transaction costs in
relation to small business debtors who have an added degree of
sophistication arising out of the disclosure from franchisors.
Extrapolating on the definition of materiality in the franchise
setting, 254 there is already an argument to be made that types of available
financing are material and should be disclosed to a franchisee. In
Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 255 the court defined materiality in the
franchise setting as judged by an objective standard, a statutory or
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
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regulatory approach beyond the common law’s almost cavalier, laissezfaire perspective. The Florida statute interpreted in Barnes is similar to
the FTC Rule and to many state rules or statutes in that it requires
franchisor to do more than not commit common law fraud, but instructs
franchisors that they must “disclose efforts to sell or establish more
franchises or distributorships than is reasonable to expect the market or
market area for the particular franchise or distributorship to sustain.” 256
While the common law cases on fraud narrow the mandatory disclosures
to “facts material to the contract at issue” and bar from consideration
“mere possibilities and facts that the defendant may not think are
relevant,” the franchise law “broadens the scope of information which
must be disclosed to include efforts to sell or establish more franchises
and imposes an objective standard of relevancy.” 257
Under the proposed expansive definition of materiality, potential
franchisees could mull over information related to outside types of
financing. For a franchisee who needs financing quickly, traditional
financing forms may not be available, and, depending on why the
franchisee needs financing, the franchisee may not qualify for traditional
financing. This, it turns out, is a very real problem. 258 Faced with this
situation, one alternative for the potential franchisee may be fringe
financing. When a potential franchisee is considering what is important
in deciding to purchase a business, financing information—how the
franchisee will fund his business—is vital. If information relating to
fringe financing were disclosed by the franchisor, the franchisee would
not only be making a more informed purchase when it acquires a
franchise, the franchisee would also be more prepared when a situation
entailing the need for fringe financing arises.
In summary, the benefits of a disclosure are threefold. Disclosing
information related to fringe financing protects the franchisee, it benefits
the franchisor, and it gives regulators the freedom to promulgate rules

256. FLA. STAT. § 817.416(2)(a)(3) (2011). Another prohibited failure to disclose, which is
far beyond common law restrictions, is to not tell a prospective franchisee “the known required total
investment” for a franchise. Id. at § 817.416(2)(a)(2).
257. Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1432 (S.D. Fla. 1986). Florida law, for
example, forbids franchisors from misrepresenting not just established facts (e.g., something in the
past—actual results), but also “the prospects or chances for success of a proposed or existing
franchise.” FLA. STAT. § 817.416(2)(a)(1)(2011).
258. The marketing director for V2K window décor & more, Paul Linenberg, reported, “[w]e
were finding that people otherwise qualified can’t get financing through traditional methods,” that
“[d]emand is still out there, but the availability of credit is thin.” Jonathan Maze, Tight Credit Is
Turning Franchisors into Lenders, FRANCHISE TIMES, Apr. 2009, available at
http://www.franchisetimes.com/April-2009/Tight-credit-is-turning-franchisors-into-lenders/.
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that focus on true consumers of these services, the individual, without
raising transaction costs and administrative hurdles for small business
debtors that need to obtain financing from fringe services.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regulation of fringe lenders will likely prove a more difficult
challenge than many anticipate. Most would agree that consumer
protection laws will prove useful in a market where the engagement in,
and continuing potential for, egregious practices is substantial. Still, the
CFPB must find a way to balance its regulations with the maintenance of
individual autonomy in financial decision-making and the grant of
greater access to funds for the unbanked and those with poor credit.
This balance should be contemplated with competing private interests in
mind, namely the need for individual consumer protection from
potentially predatory practices, and the unfettered access to a stream of
financial support for small business debtors. The need for balance is
especially clear when one gazes outside the tent of the usual “consumer”
and instead looks at small business debtors, such as franchisees.
Perhaps this balance can be achieved by regulating individual
consumer use more heavily, while applying fewer or lighter regulations
for small business debtors. The idea would be to clarify that increased
protections for debtors would only extend to completely consumeroriented loans. Federal bank examiners might push for a slightly lower
level of high-risk consumer borrowers in lender loan portfolios. This
requirement likely would increase the need for banks to investigate fully
the potential consumer-borrowers before lending them funds. Although
that could tighten credit, at least marginally and comparatively, for a
small percentage of consumers, it would have the reverse effect on small
business, as the lenders can go with a lower level of “due diligence” in
determining whether to lend to franchisees.
While there is a risk that potential franchisees may not be as
sophisticated as their peers (other applicants or actual franchisees) and
therefore may not be afforded as much protection, that is an inherent risk
which an individual must take in pursuit of building a business. This
two-tiered approach (CFPB regulations for consumers, and perhaps for
nonfranchised, independent, small business owners; but merely
franchisor disclosures to franchisees) may be the best way to balance the
obvious need for individual consumer protection from predatory
practices, while at the same time not stifling an important stream of
revenue for small business debtors. Indeed, for franchisors and
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franchisees to focus only on disclosures may hone their attention on
what matters most—the franchise network. Disclosing such information
is even in the franchisor’s best interest, as the disclosures increase the
level of sophistication of the franchisee, and will inform the franchisee
on how to make better business decisions. Armed with this information,
the franchisee will be more acutely aware of risks when seeking
financing from a fringe lender.
Franchisees should not be treated as “consumers” subject to strict
regulations, while non-business individuals, genuine consumers, should
be afforded this greater oversight and protection because they lack the
support of the franchise model.
However, in order for this
comparatively “hands off” approach to regulation to take hold, lenders
and franchisors should both be proactive in terms of ascertaining the
total amount, and the purposes behind, all financing that a franchisee
obtains. For lenders not to be subject to special, consumer-oriented
protections, they need to have obtained disclosures from the business
debtor indicating her particular, non-consumer use of the money - that it
is to help pay some of the upfront costs in becoming a franchisee of the
X Corporation, with that disclosure also forwarded to the X Corporation
itself. Moreover, there should be an affirmative declaration that the
franchisee has consulted with the franchisor about her various financing
options, including, specifically, the use of lenders other than traditional
banks. So long as the franchisor is informed as to what the franchisee is
doing, then franchisee protections may arise within the franchise
relationship itself.
The franchisor must assist—at least with information, if not more—
its franchisees insofar as they need help in finding financing. This
private network of franchisor counseling can be the basis for focusing
the latest public law intervention on behalf of fringe lending debtors to
those who are truly consumers, not small business owners. As long as
the franchisee has actively engaged the franchisor in its financing
process, then the focus of limited regulatory resources can be on
ordinary consumer loans, with the franchisee having other avenues to
pursue fraud, breach of contract, or other claims with respect to
financing gone awry.
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